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I. INTRODUCTION
In The Problem of Social Cost,' the foundational article of the
law and economics movement, Ronald Coase suggested that when
transaction costs are zero, the initial allocation of a legal entitlement
is irrelevant to its eventual ownership.2 Assuming no transaction
costs, the Coase Theorem predicts that if party A values an entitle-
ment more than does party B, A will keep the entitlement if it is in-
itially allocated to him, and he will buy it if it is originally allocated to
B.3 This powerful insight depends on the behavioral assumption that
an individual's valuation of entitlements does not depend on owner-
ship; that is, A values an entitlement neither more nor less if he is
initially allocated that entitlement than if it is initially given to B.
4
The assumption that preferences are exogenous to entitlement
allocations is empirically testable, however, and has been demon-
strated to be false, at least under some conditions. The empirical
evidence, labeled alternatively the "status quo bias,"5 the "endowment
effect,"6 or the "offer/asking price gap,"7 instead suggests that the
initial allocation of legal entitlements can affect preferences for those
entitlements. The consequence is that completely alienable legal
entitlements will be "sticky"-that is, tend not to be traded-even
when such stickiness cannot be explained by transaction costs. The
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
2. See id; see also ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 81-82 (2d ed.
1997).
3. See Coase, supra note 1, at 6; see also A. MITCHELL POLINKSY, AN INTRODUCTION TO
LAW AND ECONOMICS 11-12 (2d ed. 1989) (explaining the Coase Theorem).
4. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in
Legal Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1504 (1998) (noting that if
people demand more money to sell something they own than they would pay to buy the same
item, the Coase Theorem might "fail[ ] in real life").
5. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83
CORNELL L. REv. 608 (1998) [hereinafter Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias]; William Samuelson &
Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
6. See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman et al., Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the
Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1325 (1990); Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of
Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39,44 (1980).
7. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Cost Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,
33 STAN. L. REV. 387, 401 (1981); Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the Offer/Asking
Price Gap: Toward a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation, 46 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1994)
[hereinafter Korobkin, Policymaking].
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evidence thus describes an important flaw in the Coase Theorem's
mighty armor. The principle goal of one branch of the discipline of
"behavioral law and economics" or "law and behavioral science"s is to
explore the legal implications of this flaw.9
In a previous article, I argued that contracting parties are less
likely to bargain around background-or "default"--contract terms
established by the law than the Coase Theorem would predict because
the parties are likely to view default terms as a constituent part of the
status quo, much like an entitlement.1o The claim, if correct, has both
positive and normative implications for the analysis of contract de-
fault rules. On the positive side, it leads to predictions that differ
from traditional law and economics analysis regarding what circum-
stances are necessary for contracting parties to bargain around de-
fault rules.1" On the normative side, it suggests somewhat different
strategies (again, compared to traditional law and economics analysis)
for lawmakers interested in selecting contract default rules that will
enable private bargainers to maximize allocative efficiency.12
8. The newness of this subdiscipline of law is perhaps nowhere more evident than in its
failure to find a widely agreed-upon name yet. Last year, the National Bureau of Economic
Research sponsored a conference entitled "Behavioral Approaches to Law and Economics" that
addressed questions similar to those addressed in this Vanderbilt Law Review Symposium. See
Behavioral Approaches to Law and Economics, NBER REP., Winter 1997-98, at 18-19. The
organizers of that conference have subsequently published a general article on the subdiscipline,
entitled "A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics." Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998). The problem with this syntax is
that, by highlighting the strong ties of this body of legal scholarship to the law and economics
movment, it perhaps obscures the equally strong ties the subdiscipline has to other disciplines
that study human behavior, particularly psychology but also sociology and organizational
behavior. For this reason, I prefer the monicker "law and behavioral science" for the movement
as a whole. This is, in fact, the title that Professor Thomas Ulen and I have given to the course
we teach that applies a wide range of research from behavioral decision theory to legal
problems.
9. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Legal Policy and the Endowment Effect, 20 J. LEGAL
STUD. 225 (1991); Kennedy, supra note 7; Korobkin, Policymaking, supra note 7; Korobkin, The
Status Quo Bias, supra note 5; David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate
Law Reform: Employment At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998); Jeffiey J.
Rachlinskd, Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541 (1998); see
generally Langevoort, supra note 4. For an intellectual precursor of this line of inquiry, see
Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and the Coase Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L.
REV. 669 (1979).
10. See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 5.
11. See id. at 665-66 (claiming that parties will only bargain around a default rule if the
party disadvantaged by the default term values the term more than the other party, determined
by the sum of(1) the parties'joint transaction costs of bargaining, (2) the value to either party of
not revealing information that must be revealed to contract around the term, and (3) the parties'
joint preference for the status quo).
12. See id. at 670-75 (recommending "tailored" default rules and "non-enforcement"
default rules).
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This Article advances two primary claims in an attempt to
broaden and deepen the scope of previous analysis. The first claim is
that the status quo bias has broader ramifications for contract
negotiations than causing parties to prefer terms identified as legal
defaults to those that are not legal defaults. There is likely to be a
bias in contract negotiations in favor of any contract term that serves
as a reference point-or point of departure-for bargaining. Legal
default rules may serve as such reference points, but so may terms in
form contracts used as the basis for negotiations, or terms embodied
in preliminary drafts prepared by one party. I assert that the
operative dichotomy for negotiators is not between default terms and
non-default terms, but rather between inaction (which parties gener-
ally prefer) and action (which parties prefer to avoid). Parties are
likely to favor default terms, in many instances, because these terms
are often correlated with inaction (i.e., the default terms will be op-
erative if the parties do nothing). But contracting parties will tend to
favor any terms that will operate in the absence of a specific agree-
ment to the contrary. I call this the "inertia theory" of contract nego-
tiation.
If this claim is correct, its positive implications are similar to,
although broader than, those suggested in my previous article: terms
contained in an initial "draft contract" will have far more staying
power than the transaction costs associated with changing the terms,
standing alone, would suggest. The claim also has significant pre-
scriptive implications for parties negotiating contract terms. A bar-
gaining party can gain a strategic advantage by establishing a set of
favorable contract terms as the reference point for negotiations. This
advantage is likely to be more powerful than would be suggested by
the Coasean hypothesis that initially proposed terms are likely to
"stick" only if the transaction costs associated with changing them
exceed the difference in value between the initially proposed terms
and alternatives.
This Article's second claim concerns the motivational basis of
negotiators' preference for inaction over action. I contend that a bias
in favor of inaction minimizes possible future regret that a negotiator
might experience if agreed upon contractual terms turn out, in
hindsight, to be undesirable. This claim rests on a large body of
psychological literature demonstrating that individuals suffer more
regret from taking ill-fated actions than from failing to act, and it is
consistent with evidence that individuals are not biased against ac-
tion when the consequences of actions are certain.
1586 [Vol. 51:1583
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The Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews existing data
demonstrating that negotiating parties are biased in favor of default
contract terms under some conditions. Part III develops the inertia
theory of contract negotiation. It begins by explaining how, in some
circumstances, a negotiator's bias in favor of default terms can be
viewed as a rational, profit-maximizing strategy designed to take
advantage of "network benefits" and "learning benefits" that accrue to
users of common contract terms. It then presents experimental evi-
dence, however, demonstrating that negotiators can be biased in favor
of default terms even when these terms are not common, and can be
biased against default terms even when these terms are common.
The common conclusion of all of the experimental results is that nego-
tiators tend to favor terms that will take effect if the negotiators do
nothing, as compared to terms that become operational only through
affirmative actions of negotiators. Part IV of the Article develops the
claim that the preference for inertia is motivated by a desire to mini-
mize future regret. It begins by reviewing the psychological literature
on counterfactual thinking and regret theory consistent with this
claim. It then presents experimental evidence demonstrating that the
preference for inertia evaporates when there is no uncertainty as to
the future consequences of choices-a result consistent with the pre-
dictions of the regret hypothesis.
II. THE BIAS IN FAVOR OF DEFAULT CONTRACT TERMS
The argument begins with the assertion that contracting par-
ties prefer contract terms that are legal defaults to terms that are not
legal defaults.13 This argument was advanced in a previous article
and is based on the results of a series of experimental tests
demonstrating that contracting parties are more likely to prefer a
contract term if it is the default than if it is not.14 This preference for
13. Even in light of the large body of experimental literature demonstrating that
individuals value entitlements more if they are endowed with the entitlement than if they are
not, these results were far from obvious because contract default rules do not endow contracting
parties (even the party who is favored by the content of the default term) with any entitlements
at all. A default contract term can be advantageous to a contracting party only if he is able to
convince his counterpart to enter into a contract that includes that term. Another way to put
the point is to say that a contract default term that favors one party (a "buyer" for instance, in
his dealings with a "seller") is not a vested entitlement in the way that a property right is a
vested entitlement. A bargaining party's counterpart can render such an "illusory entitlement"
worthless simply by refusing to enter into a contract without substituting another term for the




default terms is evident even when transaction costs of contracting
around the default are very low and there is no strategic advantage in
choosing not to contract around the default. This Article thus begins
with a brief synopsis of the evidence supporting this claim.15
The bias in favor of contract default terms, contrary to
Coasean law and economics analysis, was demonstrated in three ex-
periments, two of which will serve as a point of comparison for the
new data presented in this Article. In both of these experiments, law
students who had completed a contracts course were asked to play the
role of an attorney in a series of hypothetical negotiation scenarios.
In each scenario, subjects were provided with written fact patterns
describing negotiations between their client, a company called
"NextDay" that specializes in overnight package delivery, and a cus-
tomer of NextDay's called "Gifts, Inc.," a catalog operator ready to
enter into a contract with NextDay for the shipment of its packages
around the country. After being presented with the relevant informa-
tion, subjects were asked to provide advice to their client on how to
proceed in the negotiations. The advice was solicited by asking the
subjects to place a monetary value on contract terms that were the
subject of negotiations.
For each negotiation scenario, subjects were randomly given
one of two or more experimental conditions that differed from each
other in only one way: the information provided about whether the
contract term at issue was the default term (that would govern the
parties unless they agreed otherwise) or an alternative to the default
term. The importance of a term's status as the "default" was meas-
ured by comparing the value placed upon the term by subjects who
were told that it was the default with the value assigned it by those
who were told that it was an alternative to the default.
The first experiment ("Consequential Damages") dealt with a
contract term delineating the amount of damages for which the sub-
ject's client, Next Day, could be held liable if it failed to deliver a
Gifts, Inc. package on time. The experiment tested whether the sub-
jects' preference for a favorable contract term depended on whether
the term was the default or an alternative to the default. All of the
subjects participating in this experiment were told that Gifts, Inc.
would prefer a contract term that would hold NextDay liable for all
damages caused by its failure to meet its delivery obligations. They
15. What follows is only a brief summary of the experimental design and results. For a
more detailed description of the experiments and a discussion of the results, see iC at Parts
HIIA-B.
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were also told that NextDay, in contrast, would prefer a contract term
limiting its potential liability to damages that were "reasonably
foreseeable" at the time that NextDay took possession of the package
in question. Subjects were advised that NextDay's accountants had
estimated that there was a ninety-five percent chance that a contract
including the broader "full liability" damages clause would cost
NextDay, on average, $0-$10 more per package than would a contract
with the narrower "limited liability" damages clause.16
Subjects randomly assigned to condition 1 ("Limited Liability")
of the experiment were told that the limited "reasonably foreseeable"
damages term was the legal default in their state. They were asked
how much money per package Gifts, Inc. would have to agree to pay
NextDay above what the contract price would otherwise be before
they would recommend that NextDay contract around the limited
liability default in favor of a full liability term.17 In contrast, subjects
assigned to condition 2 ("Full Liability") of the experiment were
informed that the default term was one of full liability. They were
asked how much of a per-package reduction in the contract price
(below what it would otherwise be) they would recommend NextDay
be willing to accept for shipping if, in return, Gifts, Inc. would agree
to include a limited liability term in the contract. 8
The transaction costs associated with contracting around the
default term in the experiment were neglible, if they existed at all.
Contracting around the default did not require more mental effort
than accepting the default, as all subjects were required to value the
difference between the default term and its alternative. And there
were no marginal drafting costs associated with contracting around
the default, as both conditions of the experiment provided the subjects
with the precise language that would be inserted into the contract if
the parties agreed to contract around the default. Additionally, there
were no strategic reasons for subjects to decline to contract around
the default terms (it was clear to both parties prior to negotiating that
NextDay would prefer limited liability, and that Gifts, Inc. would
prefer full liability) or to be less than truthful in revealing the value
they placed on contracting around the default (subjects were asked to
provide their valuation to their client in order to determine a
negotiating strategy, not to suggest a value that would actually be
used in bargaining). Consequently, Coasean law and economics
16. See infra Appendices A1-A2.
17. See infra Appendix Al.
18. See infra Appendix A2.
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analysis would predict that valuations would not differ, on average,
between subjects assigned to condition 1 and those assigned to
condition 2.
The mean valuations were, however, significantly affected by
condition.19 Subjects in condition 1 ("Limited Liability") (N=26) rec-
ommended, on average, that NextDay demand a minimum of $6.96
per package before agreeing to include a full liability term in the
contract. Condition 2 ("Full Liability") subjects (N=28), on the other
hand, recommended, on average, that NextDay be willing to offer a
maximum discount of $4.46 per package for Gifts, Inc.'s agreement to
include a limited liability term in the contract. The difference
between the mean responses of subjects in the two conditions can best
be understood as one measure of the strength of the substantive bias
for terms that are identified as the default over those identified as
alternatives to the default.
Table 1.A. Consequential Damages Results
Condition N Default Rule Mean Valuation
1 26 Limited Liability $6.96/package
2 28 Full Liability $4.46/package
The second experiment ("Impossibility Excuse") made use of
the same background facts but changed the subject matter of the ne-
gotiation. Rather than being asked to value the difference between a
contract with a full liability term versus a limited liability term, sub-
jects were asked to value the difference between a contract which
would excuse NextDay on the grounds of impossibility or
impracticability and one that would not. In the former case, NextDay
would be excused from its contractual obligations if an unforeseen
contingency beyond its control were to occur that rendered
performance of its obligations "commercially impracticable." In the
latter case, NextDay would be forced to perform its obligations or pay
damages, regardless of the occurrence of any contingency in or out of
NextDay's control, foreseeable or not. Unlike the Consequential
Damages experiment, the Impossibility Excuse experiment did not
provide subjects with expert estimates of differences in costs that
NextDay might expect to incur under a contract that recognized the
impracticability excuse and one that did not.20
19. p <.001.
20. See infra Appendices B1-B2.
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Mirroring the design of the Consequential Damages experi-
ment, approximately half of the subjects in the Impossibility Excuse
experiment were randomly assigned to condition 1 ("Impractibility").
These subjects were told that the default legal rule provided for the
impossibility/impracticability excuse and were asked to recommend
the minimum amount NextDay should demand before agreeing to
insert a "no excuse" clause in the contract.21 The other half of the
subjects, assigned to condition 2 ("No Excuse"), were told that the
default rule was one of "no excuse." They were asked for the maxi-
mum amount NextDay should be willing to pay if Gifts, Inc. would
agree, in return, to include in the contract a clause providing for an
impossibility/impracticability excuse.
22
Again, although Coasean economic analysis would suggest that
the subjects' responses should not depend on the condition to which
they were assigned (and thus what term they were told was the
default), defining the default contract term differently had a
significant effect on subjects' valuations.3 Subjects assigned to
condition 1 ("Excuse") (N=22) recommended, on average, that
NextDay demand a side payment of at least $188,000 before agreeing
to include a "no excuse" term in the contract. Subjects assigned to
condition 2 ("No Excuse") (N=25) recommended, on average, that
NextDay be willing to pay no more than $56,000 to convince Gifts,
Inc. to add an "excuse" term to the contract.24 Although subjects in
both conditions clearly would prefer a contract with an "excuse" term
to one with a "no excuse" term, their preference for the former was
much stronger when it was identified as the default than when it was
identified as the alternative. Again, labeling a term as the default
appeared to strengthen subjects' preference for the term.
21. See infra Appendix B1.
22. See infra Appendix B2.
23. p <.01.
24. The distribution of responses to the various manipulations of the Impossibility Excuse
scenario reported in this Article were non-normal (right-skewed). Consequently, all statistical
tests reported were conducted on the natural logs of the responses, rather than on the raw
responses themselves, and the reported mean values are geometric (rather than actual) means.
For this reason, the mean values reported for conditions 1 and 2 differ from the mean values
reported in The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Bias. Compare Korobkin, The Status
Quo Bias, supra note 5, at 643 (reporting the means of the raw responses).
1998] 1591
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Table 2A. Impossibility Excuse Results
Condition N Default Rule Mean Valuation
1 22 Excuse $188,000
2 25 No Excuse $ 56,000
III. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF INERTIA
Can the traditional tools of Coasean economic analysis convinc-
ingly explain the demonstrated bias in favor of default terms in con-
tract negotiations? The most obvious avenue for explaining the bias
in traditional terms would be to focus on the incentive effects of
transaction costs. Terms that will govern a contract only if the par-
ties take affirmative steps to establish the term can be more expen-
sive to implement than are terms that operate as a result of inaction.
All other things equal, parties should rationally prefer contract terms
that require less time and effort to negotiate and draft than alterna-
tives.
Transaction cost explanations seem strained, however, in the
context of the controlled experiments reported above. The experi-
ments were designed so that no possible response from subjects im-
plied longer or more complicated negotiations than any other re-
sponse. In both the Consequential Damages and Impossibility Excuse
scenarios, subjects were effectively told they were negotiating the
terms in question; no value that they might have placed on favorable
terms relative to unfavorable ones would have suggested lower costs
of negotiating. In addition, subjects responding to both scenarios
were provided with the text of the relevant "alternative" term (i.e., the
term that they could select by contracting around the default). The
existence of the alternative terms demonstrated that there were no
higher costs of drafting associated with contracting for the alternative
term rather than accepting the default term. Consequently, although
transaction costs explanations are often powerful in understanding
why parties select the apparent path of least resistance, something
else appears to underlie the observed bias in favor of terms identified
as the default.
From the perspective of the Coase Theorem, the results seem
quite puzzling. If ownership of property should not affect its valu-
ation, why would the identity of one possible contract term as the
1592 [Vol. 51:1583
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"default" affect its valuation when transaction costs are at or near
zero? An emerging economic literature on learning and network
benefits suggests that such disparate valuations for default terms and
alternative terms might in fact be fully rational and profit-maximiz-
ing for contracting parties under certain conditions. This Part first
explains how the status quo bias could potentially be reconciled with
rational profit maximization, but then presents experimental evidence
that suggests this explanation is not fully convincing. It is possible
that learning and network benefits could be important drivers of the
status quo bias in some instances. But the experimental evidence
suggests that the bias in favor of default terms is at least partially the
result of deeply ingrained psychological instincts that cause us to
favor inaction over action, even when doing so is not profit maximiz-
ing.
A. The Rationalist Response: Learning and Network Benefits
In recent articles, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner have
developed a theory of why corporate contracts often contain standard,
"boilerplate" terms.25 Their analysis can be extended to explain why
contracting parties would tend to prefer default terms, all other
things equal. Kahan and Klausner's explanation of standard terms is
based on the insight that past or future use of contract terms by unre-
lated parties can provide value to contracting parties, above and be-
yond the intrinsic, or inherent, value of the term itself.2 The authors
define non-inherent value as "'increasing returns' to users as more
firms adopt the same term.27 They then divide the carriers of this
value into two related but distinct categories: "network" benefits and
"learning" benefits.2
Network benefits arise when the value of a product to one of its
users depends on the number of other users of the same product.29
25. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Kiausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) [hereinafter Kahan &
Klausner, Standardization]; Michael Klausner, Corporate Law and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995).
26. Elsewhere, Kahan and Klausner recognize that cognitive biases can also lead to
standardization of contract terms. See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path
Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347 (1996) (discussing "learning" and "network' benefits) [hereinafter Kahan
& Klausner, Path Dependence].
27. Kahan & Klausner, Standardization, supra note 25, at 718.
28. Id. at 716; see also Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 26, at 350-58.
29. Cf Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985) (explaining products subject to network
19981 1593
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The prototypical example of an item with large network benefits is
the telephone. A telephone would have no value if owned by only one
person-he or she would have no one to call! Moreover, the value of a
telephone to any particular user increases as the number of other
users increases.30 Put slightly differently, the demand for a tele-
phone, like other network goods, depends not only on its price and
quality (its inherent value) but also on the expected size of the net-
work (other users).31 Today, the personal computer ("PC") is often
used as an example of a product with large network benefits. Unlike
the telephone, a PC would have value to a single user. But the value
of a PC increases as its number of users increase, both because this
gives users the chance to connect with each other via a computer
network (direct network benefits), and because it increases the
likelihood that complementary goods (e.g., software) will be developed
for the machine (indirect network benefits).3 2
Kahan and Klausner have suggested that contract terms can
carry with them analogous network benefits.33 That is, the users of a
given contract term can conceivably benefit from other parties using
the same term in their contractual relationships. Much like a com-
puter, a contract term has inherent value to parties that adopt it,
independent of its adoption elsewhere, and also a network value that
increases as the number of other contracts in which the term appears
increases. Contract terms might become more valuable as more par-
ties adopt them, for example, because wider use of a term can lead to
more judicial opinions interpreting the term. More interpretations, in
turn, can benefit users of the term by reducing uncertainty over how
the term would be interpreted by a court should the user become
embroiled in litigation in the future." *Widespread use of a contract
externalities as "products for which the utility that a user derives from consumption of the good
increases with the number of other agents consuming the good"); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 134 (1994)
("[G]oods exhibit a network externality wherever the consumer enjoys benefits or suffers costs
from changes in the size of an associated network, that is, changes in quantities demanded").
30. See generally Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network
Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 94 (discussing fax machines).
31. See id at 96.
32. See Klausner, supra note 25, at 772-73; see also Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan,
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 488-99 (1998) (using
computer operating systems as an example of how network benefits can arise as a result of
increasing returns based on positive feedback from the market); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra
note 29, at 135 (distinguishing between direct and indirect network externalities).
33. See Kiausner, supra note 25, at 774-89.
34. See id. at 776-77.
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term can also create benefits for users by making lawyers35 and other
providers of legal services more facile in drafting, negotiating, inter-
preting, and, if need be, litigating the term. Such facility can create
value to term users by increasing the quality of legal service and/or
reducing its cost.36 For contract terms important enough to affect a
firm's value in the capital markets, widespread use of a term can
lessen the difficulty that investment analysts will have in pricing a
firm's securities, thus creating another type of network benefit.,3 7 In
short, widespread use of a contract term can benefit users of the term
by causing complementary goods (such as judicial precedents or pro-
fessional services) to become more available, cheaper, or both.ss
Learning benefits arise from the same sources as network
benefits, and they differ from their close cousins only temporally. 9
Network benefits accrue to users of a contract term when other par-
ties choose to use the same term contemporaneously (i.e., the lives of
the contracts that use the same term overlap). Learning benefits, in
contrast, accrue to parties that select a contract term commonly used
in the past (i.e., the contracts that create the positive externalities to
the user are no longer active when the user adopts the term).40
Learning benefits, for example, can take the form of existing judicial
precedents that reduce uncertainty over interpretation of a term in
the future and existing knowledge of and facility with a term on the
part of legal and financial professionals. 41
The promise of learning and network benefits could encourage
firms to select default terms just as these benefits can provide an
incentive for firms to adopt standard terms. This is because "a de-
fault term... may become a focal point around which a contractual
network forms." 42 Put another way, contracting parties might predict
35. Lawyers might have an independent incentive to favor commonly used terms. Kahan
and Klausner have noted that lawyers are less likely to be criticized or, worse, sued, when
misfortune arises from the use of a common term rather than a unique one. See Kahan &
Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 26, at 356.
36. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardization, supra note 25, at 725-27; Klausner, supra
note 25, at 782-84.
37. See Klausner, supra note 25, at 785-86 (calling this type of benefit a "marketing
network externalit[y]").
38. Cf. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 29, at 135 (describing indirect network externali-
ties as a situation in which complementary goods become cheaper or more plentiful as the
number of users of the primary good increases).
39. See Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence, supra note 26, at 351 ("N]etwork benefits
mirror... learning benefits... but they arise in the future.").
40. See Klausner, supra note 25, at 786-88.
41. See Kahan & Kiausner, Standardization, supra note 25, at 722-24; Klausner, supra
note 25, at 786.
42. Klausner, supra note 25, at 828.
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that, because of their salience, default terms will be adopted by most
parties most of the time.43 This assumption makes it rational for par-
ties that wish to take advantage of learning and network benefits of
contract terms to adopt defaults as well, regardless of whether the
defaults have a higher inherent value than do alternative terms.
Kahan and Klausner point out that by incorporating in
Delaware, corporations can effectively "purchase" a set of commonly
used corporate law default terms, which permit incorporating firms to
capture learning and network benefits.44 The assumption that implic-
itly underlies the suggestion that contracting parties can take advan-
tage of network benefits by adopting Delaware law is that most firms
incorporated in Delaware do not contract around the default corporate
contract terms in most instances. If firms systematically incorporated
in Delaware, but then systematically contracted around Delaware
default legal rules, the presumed network benefits of adopting
Delaware law would not exist.45
Similarly, when contracting parties are engaged in negotia-
tions over contract terms, there will often be learning and network
benefits that can be captured by accepting legal default terms, but
only under the assumption that the default terms are commonly in-
corporated into other contracts. As long as this key assumption is
accurate, learning and network benefits can reinforce the intrinsic
value of a term that is favorable to a contracting party, and mitigate
costs of an unfavorable term. Consequently, learning and/or network
externalities could conceivably cause a bias among contracting parties
for default terms, all other things equal.
While such an explanation is not consistent with the Coase
Theorem in its most basic form, it is fully consistent with traditional
law and economics more generally. It suggests that by favoring de-
fault terms, contract negotiators might rationally maximize the value
of their contracts. Imagine that a particular contract term, "Term A,"
has an inherent value of "X" to a negotiating party, and an alternative
term, "Term B," has an inherent value of "Y" to that same party.
Imagine also that either term would have an additional value of "Z" if
it were the default term, due to the learning and network benefits
derived from the extensive adoption of default terms into other con-
43. Cf. Kahan & Klausner, Path Dependence supra note 26, at 350 ("Because many firms
operate under the default rule, the default rule is, in effect, a standard contract term.").
44. See Kahan & Klausner, Standardization, supra note 25, at 718.
45. Under this set of assumptions, incorporating in Delaware would still permit a party to
take advantage of network benefits created by that state's mandatory, or "immutable," terms,
which, by definition, parties cannot contract around.
1596 [Vol. 51:1583
INERTIA AND CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
tracts. For some parties, the difference between the inherent value of
the two terms (X minus Y) will be greater than the learning and net-
work benefits associated with adopting the default term. For these
parties, the designation of one of the terms as the default should not
affect their preference for a term among the two options-the parties
will contract for the term with the greatest inherent value. For other
parties, however, the difference between the two terms' values might
be small relative to the value of the learning and network benefits
associated with using the default, such that Z > (X minus Y). While
these parties might prefer one term over the other in the abstract, if a
default term were identified, they would prefer the default regardless
of defined intrinsic worth. As long as both types of parties exist across
a large number of contracts, we should expect to see a bias in favor of
the default term (even absent any transaction costs associated with
contracting around the default). Such a result would be fully
consistent with rational wealth-maximizing behavior.46
B. Evaluating Network/Learning Benefits as Drivers of the
Bias in Favor of Defaults
In theory, the incentive to capitalize on network and/or learn-
ing benefits could cause wealth-maximizing contracting parties to
favor certain contract terms more when those terms are identified as
legal defaults than when they are not.47  But does the net-
work/learning benefits account of contract term choice adequately
explain the experimental results described above?
At first glance, the network/learning benefits account seems an
unlikely explanation of the bias exhibited in favor of default terms in
the experiments. Benefits from judicial interpretation of contract
terms will be greatest when there is a wide range of terms in use to
deal with a particular contracting contingency. In the experiments,
however, subjects were told that there were only two terms to con-
sider: If they contracted around the default of "limited liability," they
46. Cf. Klausner, supra note 25, at 791 (noting that network benefits can cause value-
maximizing managers to adopt a term that is not socially optimal).
47. How significant network and learning benefits are in the context of contract terms is
another question entirely, and one that is beyond the scope of this Article. One pair of commen-
tators has vigorously disputed the practical value of the Kahan and Klausner application of
network benefits theory to corporate contract terms. See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 32, at
568-70. Lemley and McGowan argue, for example, that specific contract terms gain little
additional value from interpretation, and that the clarity to be gained from interpretations of
open-ended terms is limited by the flexible nature of such terms and the relatively few reported
decisions interpreting even common terms. See id. at 570-76.
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could select only a "full liability" term (or vice versa); if they were to
contract around the default of "no excuse," they could choose only the
"impracticability excuse" term (or vice versa). Where choice of con-
tract terms centers around two options, the advantage of the more
common term relative to the less common term is likely to be small.
This is because the less common term is still likely to be employed in
a substantial number of cases, creating opportunities for judicial in-
terpretation of the term. In addition, the experimental subjects-law
students who had recently studied contract law-were aware that the
more open-ended of the potential terms (that is, the terms that would
benefit most from judicial interpretation) were default terms in at
least some jurisdictions, even if they were not defaults in their juris-
diction. The limited liability term in the Consequential Damages
scenario was taken from the famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale.48
The impossibility excuse term is recognized in both the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts49 and the Uniform Commercial Code.50
Consequently, when an experimental scenario did not identify these
open-ended terms as the defaults in the subjects' hypothetical juris-
diction, it is plausible to hypothesize that at least some subjects likely
assumed that the terms were common elsewhere, and thus the subject
of a substantial number of judicial interpretations.
For similar reasons, it seems unlikely that the experimental
subjects would have determined that a "limited liability" or "excuse"
term (or their opposites) would be substantially more desirable when
labeled the default because default status would suggest more famili-
arity with the terms among legal and financial professionals.
Although common terms might have benefits over obscure terms in
this regard, providers of professional services are likely to develop
expertise not only with the most common contract terms, but also
with other fairly common terms. Another way of putting this is to say
that, after the use of a term reaches a critical level, there is unlikely
to be much, if any, marginal benefit to users of that term when addi-
48. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854).
49. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981) ("Where, after a contract is
made, a party's performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an
event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract was made, his
duty to render that performance is discharged, unless the language or the circumstances
indicate the contrary.").
50. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1989) ("Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part by a
seller.., is not a breach of his duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been
made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made .... ").
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tional parties employ the term.51 Nothing in any condition of the
experimental scenarios suggests that the terms not identified as de-
faults are obscure. Consequently, it might have been quite reasonable
for parties to assume that maximum network benefits could be cap-
tured by using either of the terms-the default or the alterna-
tive--offered in the experiments.
Although it seems unlikely that the observed bias in favor of
default terms was created by subjects' desire to capture learning or
network benefits they assumed would be associated with the default
terms, this explanation cannot be ruled out based on the experimental
results described above. Consequently, to better understand the
observed bias in favor of default terms, it is necessary to explicitlytest the learning and network benefits hypotheses.
1. Controlling for Learning Benefits of the Status Quo
According to Kahan and Klausner's nomenclature, parties
accrue learning benefits from the use of a contract term prior to the
formation of their contract. Thus, if learning benefits were the main
driver of the bias in favor of default terms, it should matter little (if at
all) if the former default term were no longer the default. That is, if a
change in the law alters the default rule at approximately the same
time as contract formation, negotiators concerned with capturing
learning benefits associated with past use of the term should prefer
the "old" default term to the "new" default term. If the identity of the
default term were to change shortly before contracting and
negotiators demonstrated a bias in favor of the "new" rather than the
"old" default, this would suggest that factors other than learning
benefits were driving the bias. The following experiment, based on
the NextDay/Gifts, Inc. fact pattern described above, suggests that
the bias in favor of default terms can persist-and persist
strongly-even when there are no learning benefits associated with
accepting the default.
To test the strength of the bias in favor of default terms in the
absence of learning benefits, the Impossibility Excuse scenario was
manipulated such that the default term had no learning benefits as-
sociated with it. Condition 3 subjects were told that, under their
51. Cf. Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 29, at 140 ("[Tlhe fact that other people use the
same sort of VCR that we use makes a tape rental market available to us, but the marginal
benefits of increasing the number of households that own our kind of VCR are likely exhausted
now that businesses that rent videotapes are about as prevalent as ones that sell milk").
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state's law, impossibility or impracticability was not a valid excuse for
non-performance until just last year. Now, however, under a recently
enacted law, impossibility does constitute a valid excuse, unless the
parties determine otherwise by contract. 2 As was the case in condi-
tion 1, subjects were then advised that Gifts, Inc. was planning to
offer NextDay a side payment to accept an explicit provision disclaim-
ing impossibility as a valid excuse. Subjects were asked to state the
lowest amount they would recommend NextDay accept to include the
provision.53
Condition 4 subjects were given opposite information about the
default rule. They were told that impossibility had been a valid ex-
cuse under their state's law until recent legislation eliminated the
excuse unless, of course, individual parties explicitly provided for the
excuse in their contracts. They were asked for the maximum amount
they would recommend NextDay pay Gifts, Inc. in return for Gifts,
Inc. agreeing to include an explicit "excuse" provision in the contract.54
Since condition 3 subjects were told that the default rule tradi-
tionally had been one of "no excuse," whatever learning benefits might
have been accrued by contracting for a "no excuse" term were virtu-
ally identical to those available to condition 2 subjects, who had been
informed that the default rule (past and present) did not permit the
impossibility excuse. 55 If the status quo bias in favor of the default
term noted in the original Impossibility Excuse scenario were driven
by the potential for learning benefits, the responses of condition 3
subjects should be similar to, if not identical to, those of condition 2
subjects. In contrast to condition 2, however, condition 3 subjects
were placed in a position where inaction (i.e., not agreeing to include
the proposed provision) would result in a contract honoring the im-
possibility excuse, whereas action (i.e., including an additional term
in the contract) would result in a contract without the impossibility
excuse. Therefore, if the original status quo bias were driven by a
preference for inaction over action, all other things equal, condition 3
subject responses should be similar to those of condition 1 subjects,
who had been informed that the default rule provided for the
impossibility excuse. 56
Precisely the opposite set of predictions follow for condition 4
subjects, whose state provided the traditional default rule of impossi-
52. See infra Appendices B3-B4.
53. See infra Appendix B3.
54. See infra Appendix B4.
55. See infra Appendix B2; see also supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
56. Compare Appendix B3, with Appendix BI.
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bility as a valid excuse. The learning benefits, therefore, associated
with contracting for an explicit "excuse" term were roughly identical
to those that could be obtained by condition 1 subjects simply accept-
ing the "excuse" default.57 A preference for inaction, however, would
suggest that condition 4 subjects would accept a contractual arrange-
ment absent the impossibility excuse, whereas the affirmative action
of adding a contract provision would result in a valid impossibility
excuse--the same situation faced by condition 2 subjects.58 If the
status quo bias originally resulted from a preference for inaction (all
other things equal), condition 4 subjects' answers should parallel
those of condition 2 subjects. If the status quo bias resulted from the
perceived presence of learning benefits, the responses of condition 4
subjects should be similar to those provided by condition 1 subjects.
The results of this manipulation support the hypothesis that
the bias in favor of default terms exhibited by the original experimen-
tal subjects was not driven by subjects' attempts to capture learning
benefits. 59 Condition 3 subjects (N=23) said, on average, that they
would recommend demanding at least $139,000 to include a "no ex-
cuse" term in the contract-even though they were informed that "no
excuse" was historically the default term. On the other hand, condi-
tion 4 subjects (N=24) said, on average, that they would recommend
paying no more than $31,000 to include a term providing an impossi-
bility excuse-even though they were told that the impossibility ex-
cuse was the historical default term. The gap between the responses
of condition 3 and condition 4 subjects is highly significant, 60 and it is
not significantly different than the gap between the responses of
condition 1 and 2 subjects. In other words, subjects' responses
suggest that a desire to capture learning benefits played no role in
their decision making.
57. Compare Appendix B4, with Appendix B1.
58. Compare Appendix B4, with Appendix B2.
59. See infra Table 2.B. The findings presented here are consistent with those of Ritov &
Baron who, in other contexts, attempted experimentally to disentangle preferences for inaction
from preferences for the substantive status quo. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Status-Quo
and Omission Biases, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 49 (1992). In one experiment, the subjects said
that hypothetical actors who suffered a negative event would feel worse if they had taken an
affirmative step to maintain the status quo (which resulted in the negative event occurring)
than if they had passively allowed a change from the status quo (which resulted in the negative
event occurring). See id. at 51-54. In another experiment, subjects preferred inaction over
action, but did not significantly prefer the status quo over alternatives when the action/inaction




Table 2.B. Impossibility Excuse Results
Condition N Default Rule Mean Valuation
1 22 Excuse $188,000
2 25 No Excuse $ 56,000
3 23 Excuse $139,000
(previously no excuse)
4 24 No Excuse $31,0004__24__(previously 
excuse)
These results strongly imply, in essence, that contracting par-
ties with a preference for the status quo are likely to treat the term
that would result from inaction-not the term that they have tradi-
tionally understood to be the substantive default-as the "status quo"
term. The practical policy implication of this is that lawmakers can
probably change private parties' preferences for contract terms
quickly by altering contract default rules via legislation or judicial
decision. For example, although the impossibility excuse has a long
common law pedigree6' and a firm place in the Uniform Commercial
Code,62 if legislators or judges were to announce tomorrow that parties
must affirmatively include an impossibility provision in the contract
or else the "no excuse" rule will govern, contracting parties' preference
for the excuse would likely decline sharply, even absent transaction
costs or other impediments to bargaining. The path of least
resistance, not ingrained historical tradition, appears to define the
status quo for contracting parties.
The obvious shortcoming of this experimental test is that,
while it suggests that a bias among contracting parties for default
terms can persist even in the absence of learning benefits, it does not
control for the possibility that the bias is due entirely to perceived
network benefits. The experimental results are arguably consistent
with63 the hypothesis that contracting parties favor current default
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (1981).
62. See U.C.C. § 2-615(a) (1989).
63. If the bias in favor of default terms demonstrated in the initial experiments was
driven by a combination of learning and network benefits, then the difference between the mean
responses of condition 3 and condition 4 subjects should have been smaller (not larger) than the
difference in responses between condition 1 and condition 2 subjects, even if subjects had
consciously or unconsciously assumed that network benefits would be greater than learning
benefits. In conditions 1 and 2, learning and network benefits both pointed toward accepting
the term identified as the default. In conditions 3 and 4, however, learning and network bene-
fits were in conflict, so the benefits of accepting the current default term in order to capture net-
work benefits should have been tempered by the cost of giving up learning benefits associated
with the former default term.
1602 [Vol. 51:1583
INERTIA AND CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
terms because of perceived network benefits associated with selecting
the term most parties would likely use in the future. The following
experiment demonstrates more clearly that there is likely to be a bias
in favor of default terms even absent both learning and network
effects.
2. Standard Industry Practice vs. Legal Defaults
Contracting parties would derive learning and network bene-
fits by accepting default contract terms only on the assumption that
most similarly situated parties, past or present, would also accept the
default terms.64 It is conceivable, of course, that it would be more
common for contracting parties to opt out of a particular default term
than to accept it. In such a circumstance, considerations of learning
and network benefits associated with common usage should cause
parties to favor contracting around the default rule, all other things
equal, rather than the reverse. The following experimental manipula-
tion of the Impossibility Excuse scenario suggests, however, that a
preference for default terms, all other things equal, might persist,
even when both learning and network benefit considerations would
support the abandonment of the default.
Subjects responding to condition 5 of that scenario were
told-like condition 1 subjects65-that (1) the default rule allows im-
possibility as a valid excuse for non-performance; (2) Gifts, Inc.
planned to offer NextDay a side payment if NextDay would include a
term in the contract specifying that impossibility would not be a valid
excuse in the parties' dealings; and (3) the subjects were to recom-
mend the ninimum amount NextDay should be willing to accept in
return for agreeing to include the proposed term in the contract.66
Condition 5 subjects, however, were also given one additional piece of
information: Provisions like the one proposed by Gifts, Inc. are quite
common-in fact, they are included in the vast majority of commercial
shipping contracts, including the majority of NextDay's contracts with
commercial shippers.67
Condition 6 subjects learned-as did condition 2 sub-
jects68-that (1) the default rule was "no excuse;" (2) NextDay would
have to offer Gifts, Inc. a side-payment to include a term providing an
64. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
65. See infra Appendix BI; see also supra note 17 and accompanying text.
66. See infra Appendix B5.
67. See infra Appendix B5.
68. See infra Appendix B2; see also supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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impossibility excuse in the parties' contract; and (3) the subjects were
to recommend a maximum amount that NextDay should offer for the
inclusion of the term.69 Condition 6 subjects received the same addi-
tional instruction as condition 5 subjects: that contracting around the
default rule is common industry and company practice. 70 The impl-
cation of this instruction to condition 6 subjects, however, was that
"excuse" terms are common in the industry and to NextDay, while the
implication to condition 5 subjects was that "no excuse" terms are
common for other shipping contracts, including NextDay's.
If the bias in favor of default terms observed in the initial ex-
periment were based on perceived learning and/or network benefits
that might be derived by adopting the more common term, subjects in
condition 5 should provide responses similar to those of condition 2
subjects (both groups might have believed that the "no excuse" term
was the more common one), rather than providing responses similar
to those of condition 1 subjects (who should have assumed an "excuse"
term was more common). For the same reason, subjects in condition 6
should have provided responses similar to those of condition 1
subjects, not condition 2 subjects.
The results of the manipulation did not support the hypothesis
that subjects would favor a common term over a default term.7'1
Condition 6 subjects (N=18) provided an average "willingness to pay"
value of $20,000, while condition 5 subjects (N=18) provided a much
higher average response of $63,000. The difference between the
responses provided by condition 5 and 6 subjects is significant 2 and
is not significantly smaller than the difference between the responses
of condition I and 2 subjects and condition 3 and 4 subjects. In other
words, manipulating the information subjects were given about
whether the alternative was commonly used by contracting parties73
had no significant effect on subjects' bias in favor of the legal default
term.
69. See infra Appendix B6.
70. Compare Appendix B6, with Appendix B5; see also supra note 67 and accompanying
text.
71. See infra Table 2.C.
72. p <.05.
73. See infra Appendices B5-B6.
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Table 2.C. Impossibility Excuse Results
1605
Condition N Default Rule Mean Valuation
1 22 Excuse $188,000
2 25 No Excuse $ 56,000
3 23 Excuse $139,000
(previously no excuse)
4 24 No Excuse $ 31,000
(previously excuse)
5 18 Excuse $ 63,000
(industry norm: no excuse)
6 18 No Excuse $ 20,000
1 (industry norm: excuse)
These results provide support for the supposition that the bias
in favor of default terms is driven by more than a sophisticated,
profit-maximizing intuition that learning and/or network benefits
often counsel toward accepting default terms. Although learning
and/or network benefits might underlie a preference for common
terms in some instances, a general preference for inaction among
contracting parties is likely to be a more important explanation for
preferences for default terms.74 This can be called the "inertia theory"
of contract negotiation.
C. Form Contracts and the Power of Inertia
Assuming that the "inertia theory" explains the observed bias
in favor of default terms (i.e., a general preference for inaction over
action, all other things equal), the next question to consider is
whether contract terms other than previous default terms can embody
that power of inertia. In the previous experimental manipulation,
subjects were given the choice between a legal default and an
industry-standard contract term. The way the choice was posed
suggested that inaction on the part of the negotiating parties would
result in the operation of the default term rather than the industry
standard. The action/inaction dichotomy can be reversed by making
74. It is important to emphasize that the experimental results do not suggest that
contracting lawyers never favor common terms in order to maximize network and/or learning
benefits inherent in such terms. It is possible, for example, that practicing lawyers are more
sophisticated about such benefits than the student subjects who participated in the
experiments. But the experiments clearly suggest that network and/or learning benefits are not
likely to fully explain the preference for default terms.
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the following reasonable assumption: Parties sometimes begin
contract negotiations with a standardized form contract drafted by a
private entity such as a law firm or an industry trade association,
rather than with a blank sheet of paper backstopped by a set of
legally defined default rules which will be operative except where the
parties affirmatively contract around its terms. If the action/inaction
distinction underlies the observed bias in favor of default terms, the
use of a form contract as a basis for negotiations should create a
similar bias in favor of the form terms. This hypothesis was tested in
the following manipulation of the Consequential Damages scenario.
Like subjects in the original Consequential Damages scenario,
subjects in the new manipulation (conditions 3 and 4) were asked to
value the difference between a contract that would hold NextDay
liable to Gifts, Inc. for all consequential damages caused by NextDay's
failure to meet its delivery obligations, and a contract that would
limit NextDay's liability to damages that were reasonably foreseeable
at the time that Gifts, Inc. delivered any particular package to
NextDay for shipment. Unlike subjects in the original experimental
groups, the new subjects were told that the two companies had
"agreed to adopt, as a starting point in negotiations, a standard form
contract prepared by attorneys for the Overnight Delivery Trade
Association ("ODTA7), to which both parties are members."75 The form
contract, the subjects were informed, "is typically used as a basis for
negotiations in this type of transaction, with contracting parties
making changes to the form provisions where necessary."76
Condition 3 subjects were informed that the industry form
contract included a term that provided damages would be limited to
those "reasonably foreseesable when Carrier accepted merchandise
from shipper," whereas the default rule that would govern the parties
in the absence of any explicit term was one of full liability. They were
asked to state the minimum amount, per package, that they would
demand Gifts, Inc. offer NextDay, over and above what the contract
rate would otherwise be, before they would recommend that NextDay
agree to remove the favorable "limited liability" consequential dam-
ages term from the form contract, thus allowing the less favorable
"full liability" default term to govern.7 7 Condition 4 subjects were told
that the industry form contract provided for full liability, whereas the
legal default was one of limited liability. They were asked to reveal
75. Appendices A3-A4.
76. Id.
77. See infra Appendix A3.
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the maximum amount of money NextDay should be willing to offer
Gifts, Inc. (in the form of a per-package discount below what the con-
tract price would otherwise be) in return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to
eliminate the form contract term providing "full liability," thus per-
mitting the "limited liability" default to govern.7 8
If inertia were driving the subjects' bias in favor of the legal
default term over a contrary industry norm in the previous
experimental manipulation, subjects responding to condition 3 of the
Consequential Damages scenario should have provided larger
responses than condition 4 subjects. Notice that from a Coasean
perspective both groups of subjects were asked to perform the same
task: place a value on the difference between a contract with a
limited liability term and one with a full liability term. If parties do
prefer inaction over action, however, condition 3 subjects should have
placed a higher value on the limited liability term than condition 4
subjects, because limited liability would result from inaction for
condition 3 subjects but not for condition 4 subjects.
The experimental results bear out the inertia hypothesis.
Condition 3 subjects (N=33) revealed that they would demand, on
average, a minimum of $7.24 per package before recommending
NextDay agree to remove the limited liability term from the industry
form contract (leaving a full liability default to govern the contract).
Condition 4 subjects (N=25), in contrast, would recommend, on aver-
age, that NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. a maximum discount of $4.08 per
package in return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to remove a full liability
term from the industry form contract (leaving a limited liability de-
fault). The difference between the condition 3 and 4 Consequential
Damages subjects is statistically significant,7 9 and the gap between
condition 3 and 4 subjects is not significantly different than the gap
between condition 1 and 2 Consequential Damages subjects. In other
words, the experimental subjects showed a bias in favor of whatever
consequential damages term would govern as a result of inertia
(requiring no action at all on the part of the negotiating parties).
Whether the term associated with inaction was derived from a legal
default rule or an industry form contract serving as the basis for
contract negotiations had no statistically significant effect on subjects'
average responses.
78. See Appendix A4.
79. p < .001.
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Table 1.B. Consequential Damages Results
Condition N Default Rule Mean Valuation
1 26 Limited liability $6.96/package
2 28 Full liability $4.46/package
3 33 Full [form contract: limited] $7.24/package
4 25 Limited [form contract: full] $4.08/package
Notice that if this experimental result were examined alone, it
would be plausible to hypothesize that the difference in responses
between condition 3 and 4 subjects was driven by learning and/or
network benefits associated with adopting the contract term provided
by an industry trade association. But this analysis seems far less
plausible when the results are compared to those of the previous
version of the Impossibility Excuse scenario.80 If learning and/or net-
work benefits were driving the experimental results, subjects should
always prefer, all else equal, either the standard industry term or the
legal default term, depending upon which of these terms the subjects
believed would likely provide the greatest benefits. But subjects
would not be expected to exhibit a bias in favor of a legal default (and
against an industry standard) in one case and for an industry stan-
dard (and against a legal default) in another case. The results consid-
ered in combination provide better support for the theory that
contracting parties will prefer-again, all else equal--contract terms
that operate without the parties taking any affirmative actions.
D. Prescriptive Implications
The psychological power of inertia suggests that negotiators
who are able to define the status quo position, against which all pro-
posed terms are judged, are likely to enjoy an important bargaining
advantage. Before negotiating terms of a contract, a strategic nego-
tiator should evaluate which of many plausible reference points for
negotiations is most advantageous to her client's interests. Initial
efforts to convince the opposing negotiator that the advantageous
reference point is the most natural or reasonable from which to begin
negotiations may have a large impact on the outcome of those
negotiations. The initial terms are likely to be perceived as the terms
that will govern the parties' relationship if no further action takes
place, and thus as the status quo.
80. See supra Part II.B.2.
[Vol. 51:15831608
INERTIA AND CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
The prescriptive advice that negotiators should invest time and
resources in attempting to control the initial reference point for con-
tract negotiations is, of course, not unique to this Article. But the
underlying reasoning for this advice-that terms understood as the
status quo, or baseline, are likely to be sticky because negotiators will
prefer inaction over action-differs from conventional wisdom.
Implicit in conventional recommendations to negotiators to control the
beginning point of negotiations is often the Coasean notion of the
power of transaction costs. When contracting is expensive or difficult,
an initial proposal is likely to find its way into the final version of the
contract. Another common justification is rooted in the information
asymmetries that commonly exist in negotiating situations. Since a
negotiator is usually unaware of his opponent's reservation point, he
may be wary of suggesting changes that depart drastically from what
appears to be the status quo, for fear that the proposal might be
inferior to the opponent than the opponent's no agreement
alternatives.8' Thus, proposing a drastic departure from the status
quo could lead to a bargaining impasse. Finally, any proposal
favorable to the negotiator, whether or not it serves as an initial
reference point, is likely to affect the final agreement if there is a
strong social norm, or convention, requiring that parties "split the
difference" between conflicting positions.
The psychological power of inertia, in contrast, suggests that
the reference point for contract negotiations will affect the preferences
of bargaining parties. Negotiators will prefer an advantageous term
more strongly (or oppose a disadvantageous term less strongly) if the
term is perceived to result from inaction rather than from action.
Traditional accounts of the power of beginning points in negotiation
emphasize factors external to the negotiator that might impose costs
on deviations from the perceived status quo and, therefore, make
parties more likely to adopt status quo terms. The inertia theory
emphasizes the negotiator's internal response to the perceived status
quo that can actually increase the parties' desire for certain terms.
81. In negotiation jargon, a negotiator's best "no agreement7 alternative is known as his
'BATNA," short for "best alternative to a negotiated agreement." See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 97-106 (2d ed. 1991).
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IV. UNCERTAINTY AND ANTICIPATORY REGRET
If transaction cost and learning/network benefits explanations
are unsatisfying, why would contracting parties systematically favor
contract terms that would operate in the event of inaction? In this
Part, I propose an explanation rooted in emotional consequences of
actions rather than calculated cost-benefit analysis8 2 The theoretical
hypothesis, for which I will provide empirical support, is that a
preference for inaction is consistent with a decision-making strategy
that seeks to minimize the likelihood of future regret over choices
made.
A. Counterfactual Thinking, Norm Theory, and Regret Theory
I have previously suggested that a bias in favor of contract
default terms might result from the parties' fear of regretting deci-
sions to act affirmatively that turn out, in hindsight, to have led to
undesirable, or suboptimal, results.83 This Part elaborates on this
theory and extends the theory to all terms that result from inertia.
The following Part provides new experimental evidence supporting
the theory.
A plausible explanation of the power of inertia is that negotia-
tors fear they will suffer regret in the future over deciding to actively
shape contract terms and, therefore, will act to minimize the
possibility of experiencing such regret. 4 In most situations, contract-
ing for terms that deviate from default rules or form contracts carries
the risk of suboptimal results from the ex post perspective. That is, a
negotiator knows when she contracts around a baseline or reference
contract term that she is taking a gamble of sorts, which may or may
not be profitable, depending upon unknown future circumstances. If a
negotiator anticipates that an unprofitable ex post outcome would
82. Cf Jonathan Baron, The Effect of Normative Beliefs on Anticipated Emotions, 63 J.
PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 320, 320 (1992) ("[Elmotions, and the anticipation of these emotional
consequences can affect the choice of options").
83. See Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias, supra note 5, at 657-60.
84. Cf Richard P. Larrick, Motivational Factors in Decision Theories: The Role of Self-
Protection, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 440, 440 (1993) ("Many decisions can be understood in terms of
a desire to avoid the unpleasant psychological consequences that result from a decision that
turns out poorly. Making a choice can be threatening to the self because a poor outcome can
undermine one's sense of competence as a decision maker."); Marcel Zeelenberg et al.,
Consequences of Regret Aversion: Effects of Expected Feedback on Risky Decision Making, 65
ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 148, 149 (1996) (noting that people sometimes avoid
taking risks because they anticipate feeling regret if the worst outcome occurs).
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cause her to regret having chosen the gamble ex ante,8 she might
demand a premium above the expected value of the gamble before she
would be willing to choose the gamble8 Put another way, when de-
ciding whether to take an action with uncertain consequences, the
decision maker may determine that the expected utility of choosing
the action is lower than the inherent expected utility of the action
itself.87
This description could plausibly apply to both experimental
scenarios discussed in this Article. In the Consequential Damages
scenarios, for example, subjects are informed by NextDay's account-
ants that costs associated with accepting full liability rather than
limited liability are likely to fall between $0 and $10 per package, on
average. One interpretation of this prediction is that the expected
cost of agreeing to full liability when the inactive option is limited
liability is approximately $5 per package~8 But there is no guarantee
that if NextDay agreed to actively add a full liability term to the con-
tract for a $5 per-package premium the bargain would later appear
favorable in hindsight. In fact, there is roughly a 50% chance that the
85. Note that the regret arises from having made the decision rather than from the
outcome itself. See David E. Bell, Regret in Decision Making Under Uncertainty, 30
OPERATIONS RES. 961, 962 (1982). It is important to distinguish this negative effect from the
disappointment that arises from the negative result itself.
86. It is perhaps important to observe that in most situations in which negotiators must
choose between two contract terms, they can expect to learn at a later date how the outcome of
their decision compares with the foregone alternative. Other researchers have demonstrated
that choices made when the outcome of all alternatives will be known ex post can differ from
choices made when only the outcome of the chosen alternative will ever be known. See, e.g.,
Ilana Ritov, Probability of Regret: Anticipation of Uncertainty Resolution in Choice, 66 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 228,233-34 (1996) (finding that subjects choosing between
two lotteries with different probabilities of winning and different dollar amounts but similar ex-
pected values made different choices depending if they knew they would learn the results of the
lottery not chosen than if they would not learn these results). In a recent paper, Chris Guthrie
demonstrated that subjects believe litigants are more likely to accept a given settlement offer if
they know that they will learn what the results of adjudication would have been (and thus face
the possibility of regret) than if they will never learn what would have happened in court. See
Chris Guthrie, The Anticipatory Regret Theory of Litigation, 40-41 (March 1998) (unpublished
draft, on file with the author); see also Zeelenberg et al., supra note 84, at 156 (demonstrating
experimentally that individuals tend to avoid choices when they would learn the consequences
that would have resulted from another choice). Consequently, it is plausible that fear of regret
will not affect negotiators if they are confident they will never learn whether an alternative not
chosen would have led to better results than the alternative chosen.
87. See generally Graham Loomes & Robert Sugden, Regret Theory: An Alternative
Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty, 92 ECON. J. 805, 807-08 (1982).
88. To be precise, the expected cost of switching from limited to full liability is some
amount greater than $5 per package, as the scenario indicated that there was a 5% chance
actual damages would not fall in the $0-$10 per-package range. The simplified assumption of a
$5 per-package cost is used here merely to illustrate the thought process some subjects might
have used.
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bargain will appear unfavorable in hindsight. Perhaps the fear that a
negative outcome would lead to regret over the decision to contract for
full liability caused experimental subjects to demand more than the
inherent expected value of the gamble before they were willing to
affirmatively agree to take it.
This explanation and illustration beg two difficult questions.
First, why would subjects fear the possibility of contracting for full
liability and having the decision turn out to be unprofitable in hind-
sight more than they would fear not contracting for full liability and
having that decision turn out to be suboptimal in hindsight? It is
intuitive that a person who takes what turns out to be a losing gamble
might regret taking that gamble. It is less intuitive why the fear of
regret associated with taking action would be greater than the fear
associated with failing to act when (what turns out to have been) a
profitable opportunity presented itself. If parties fear the possibility
of future regret when they choose to act affirmatively but fear the
possibility of future regret equally when they choose not to act, there
should be no bias in favor of contract terms that take effect in the
event of inaction.8 9
In fact, there is a sound theoretical reason to believe that par-
ties might feel just as much regret if their failure to actively contract
for a term turns out (in hindsight) to be a suboptimal decision.
Failing to actively contract for a term is to actively contracting for a
term as opportunity costs are to out-of-pocket costs. From a
traditional economic perspective, opportunity costs and out-of-pocket
costs should be treated identically. A dollar not made has the same
value as a dollar lost, and, similarly, an opportunity to add a
favorable term to a contract should have the same value if it is taken
that it has if it is not taken.
The second question raised by the regret avoidance hypothesis
is why would the fear of possible regret that strikes an actor when he
considers acting affirmatively not be balanced by the hope of rejoic-
ing-the emotional opposite of regretg°-should the action yield desir-
able results? It is intuitively plausible that an actor facing a choice
with uncertain results might be hesitant to act because an
89. Cf. Bell, supra note 85, at 970-71 (hypothesizing that when considering a gamble with
long odds, 'the consequence with the largest regret is that in which you choose not to bet").
90. See Loomes & Sugden, supra note 87, at 808 (defining rejoicing as "the extra pleasure
associated with knowing that, as matters have turned out, [the decision maker] has taken the
best decision"). But see Janet Landman, Regret and Elation Following Action and Inaction:
Affective Responses to Positive Versus Negative Outcomes, 13 PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 524,
525 (1987) (defining the opposite reaction to "regret" as 'joy" or "elation").
[Vol. 51:15831612
INERTIA AND CONTRACT NEGOTIATION
undesirable result could yield regret. However, it also seems
plausible that the actor might be spurred to action because a desir-
able outcome could yield rejoicing. That is, if an actor takes action
that yields a desirable outcome, he might enjoy utility not only from
the positive result but also from the knowledge that he made the
decision that led to the positive result.91 If anticipated regret and
anticipated rejoicing caused by action are roughly equal, there should
be no general preference for inaction.
1. Action vs. Inaction
Substantial experimental evidence suggests that individuals
predict that greater regret will follow an action that leads to an unde-
sirable result than a failure to act that leads to the same undesirable
result.92 Thus, acts and nonacts, while not "ontologically or logically
distinct, are psychologically distinguishable."93
Consider the following, well-known experiment conducted by
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky.9 Experimental subjects were
told a story of two hypothetical actors who had both made unfortunate
investment decisions. Mr. Paul owned stock in Company A. He con-
sidered switching his holdings to Company B, but decided not to
switch. Subsequently, he learned that he would have been $1200
better off had he made the switch. Mr. George owned stock in
Company B. He considered switching to Company A and made the
switch. Consequently, he was $1200 worse off than he would have
been had he not made the switch.95  An astounding 92% of
experimental subjects judged that Mr. George would feel more regret
about his decision than would Mr. Paul.96
91. See Loomes & Sugden, supra note 87, at 808.
92. This conclusion has been called "perhaps the clearest and most frequently replicated
finding in the entire literature on counterfactual thinking." Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted
Medvec, The Experience of Regret: What, When, and Why, 102 PSYCH. REV. 379, 380 (1995).
93. Landman, supra note 90, at 526; cf. Thomas Gilovich et al., Commission, Omission,
and Dissonance Reduction: Coping with Regret in the "Monty Hall" Problem, 21 PERS. & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 182, 182 (1995) ("Consequentialist moral philosophers argue that there is no
difference between actions and inactions that lead to the same outcome .... Psychologists know
better.").
94. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 201 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)
[hereinafter Kahneman & Tversky, The Simulation Heuristic].
95. See Daniel Kahneman & Dale T. Miller, Norm Theory: Comparing Reality to Its





This finding was replicated by Janet Landman in a set of simi-
larly designed experiments. 97 Subjects were told three stories: a story
of two students who received undesirable grades relative to a peer,
one after switching into a class and one after choosing not to switch
out of a class; a story of two workers who were laid off, one after
changing jobs and one after deciding not to change jobs; and finally, a
story of two families whose vacations were ruined by rain, one after
switching to a new vacation venue and one after deciding to forego
other options and return to their traditional vacation venue.98 For
each of the three vignettes, between 79% and 88% of subjects
anticipated that the parties who acted would feel greater regret than
parties who did not act.99
The differential fear of ex post regret stemming from action
over inaction is consistent with a range of other experimental and
survey results, as well as a number of observable rules and regula-
tions that seem otherwise difficult to explain. The actual experience
of differential regret can explain why subjects in a blackjack experi-
ment who responded "yes" to the question "do you want a hit?" or "do
you want to stand?" and subsequently lost to the dealer reported feel-
ing more regret than subjects who answered "no" to either question
and lost the hand.1 ° It can also explain why subjects given a box con-
taining a prize of uncertain value who elected to switch boxes only to
learn they ended up with the less valuable prize placed a higher value
on that prize than subjects who kept their original box and later
learned they had the same, less valuable prize. 1 1 Decision-making
strategies geared toward avoiding this differential regret can explain
why people would choose not to vaccinate their children when vacci-
nation can sometimes cause the targeted disease, even when the risk
of contracting the disease is greater without vaccination. 10 2 And it can
97. See Landman, supra note 90.
98. See id. at 528-29.
99. See id. at 530.
100. See Dale T. Miller & Brian R. Taylor, Counterfactual Thought, Regret, and
Superstition: How to Avoid Kicking Yourself, in WHAT I&GHT HAvE BEEN: THE SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING, 305, 318 (Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, eds.,
1995) [hereinafter WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN].
101. See Gilovich et al., supra note 93, at 184-86. The experimenters concluded that the
greater regret felt by subjects who had switched boxes and obtained an undesirable outcome
than by subjects who had not acted required them to take greater steps to reduce dissonance by
placing a high value on the prize they acquired. See id. at 186.
102. See Ilana Ritov & Jonathan Baron, Reluctance to Vaccinate: Omission Bias and
Ambiguity, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 263 (1990). Ritov & Baron conclude their discussion
of a series of experiments with the observation that "subjects are reluctant to vaccinate when
the vaccine can cause bad outcomes, even if the outcomes of not vaccinating are worse." Id. at
275.
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even plausibly explain such apparently baffling rules as the Spanish
prohibition against matadors switching bulls prior to a bullfight.
10 3
The regret that arises from the occurrence of undesirable
events can be understood as a response to what is known as
"counterfactual thinking."104 The occurrence of a negative event can
cause people to attempt to mentally avoid the outcome by comparing
the event to a counterfactual alternative;10 5 that is, to some conception
of "what might have been."1°6 If the counterfactual event is perceived
by the subject as more favorable than the experienced event, the
subject is likely to experience regret.0 7 In order to understand what
type of events are likely to lead to the most regret, then, it is impor-
tant to understand the process by which counterfactual alternatives
are mentally constructed.
Daniel Kahneman and Dale Miller developed "norm theory"'0°
to provide just such an explanation. °9 Kahneman and Miller theorize
that counterfactual alternatives are constructed by beginning with
the circumstances of the experienced event and then changing one or
more elements of the factual predicate of the experienced event to
create a different outcome." 0 Individuals will tend to alter what
Kahneman and Miller term the most "mutable" elements of the expe-
rienced event's factual predicate.", Elements of the experienced event
that are considered abnormal or exceptional by a subject are most
mutable; elements that are perceived as normal or usual, in contrast,
103. See Miller & Taylor, supra note 100, at 315.
104. For a good compilation of articles on this subject, see generally WHAT MIGHT HAVE
BEEN, supra note 100.
105. See Neal J. Roese & James M. Olson, Counterfactual Thinking: A Critical Overview,
in WHAT MGHT HAVE BEEN, supra note 100, at 19-21 (reviewing evidence suggesting counterfac-
tual thinking is more likely to follow negative outcomes than positive ones); see also Landman,
supra note 90, at 532-34 (finding that positive outcomes did not lead to counterfactual thoughts).
Social psychologists believe that positive events are likely to lead to counterfactual thoughts
only when a negative event is very close to occurring. See Roese & Olson, supra, at 38.
106. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 95, at 136.
107. See Roese & Olson, supra note 105, at 37 (noting that it is "difficult to experience
regret per se without first noting that things might have turned out better").
108. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 95.
109. Although the original article describing norm theory was published in 1986, it remains
the key theoretical underpinning of current research in the field of counterfactual thinking. See
Neal Roese & Jim Olson, Preface, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, supra note 100, at vii-viii (calling
the article a "milestone" in the field and "one of the most influential theoretical statements to
have emerged in the 1980s").
110. See Roese & Olson, supra note 105, at 3 ("[A] counterfactual typically posits one
possible world that is imaginally very close to the real world, containing only a very few (or just
one) features that differentiate it from this world").
111. Cf Kahneman & Miller, supra note 95, at 137.
16151998]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
are less mutable, and at the extreme are immutable.112 Judgments of
abnormality, in turn, are based on the availability of possible alterna-
tive events in the subject's mind."1 When elements of an experience
seem normal and, thus, immutable, counterfactual comparisons will
be less available, and outcomes will often seem inevitable."4 In con-
trast, when elements of an experience are mutable and a change in
that element would avoid the negative event, that mutable element is
likely to be perceived as the cause of the negative event."5
The link between norm theory and the tendency of individuals
to favor choices correlated with inaction over action is the prediction
that actions are more mutable than failures to act."16 Specifically, "it
is usually easier to imagine oneself abstaining from actions that one
has carried out than carrying out actions that were not in fact per-
formed.""17 As one pair of social psychologists summarized the re-
search on this point, "people find it easy to imagine how taking an
action that one need not have taken would produce tortured thoughts
about what could have or should have been.""8 This conclusion has a
certain intuitive appeal: each day of our lives we take many affirma-
tive actions, but this number is certainly exceeded by the number of
possible actions that we do not take. Consequently, individuals are
likely to perceive failures to act as relatively normal, or typical, and
difficult to avoid, while they are likely to perceive actions as relatively
atypical, usually avoidable, and subject to more second-guessing. 9
112. See id.
113. See id. For a more thorough discussion of the concept of availability, see Amos
Tverksy & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185
SCIENCE 1124 (1974) [hereinafter Tverksy & Kalmeman, Judgment]. See also SCOTr PLOUS,
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 121-30 (1993).
114. See Roese & Olson, supra note 105, at 8, 16.
115. See id. at 12.
116. Another way of putting this point is to say that "actions are typically more vivid and
salient than failures to act and thus exert more impact on information processing." Gilovich et
al., supra note 93, at 182.
117. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 95, at 145.
118. Thomas Gilovich & Victoria Husted Medvec, Some Counterfactual Determinants of
Satisfaction and Regret, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, supra note 100, at 259, 264.
119. It is important to note that not all research on counterfactual thinking has found that
individuals regret actions more than inactions. In one study, Gilovich and Medvec found that
when people are asked what they would do differently if they had their lives to live over again,
they typically voice regrets over inactions (e.g., failing to work hard at their education or spend
enough time with their families). See id. at 266-69. This finding might suggest that for certain
major life decisions, inaction is as mutable as action; that in some circumstances the negative
consequences of inaction can never be known and tend to become exaggerated over time, see id.
at 266; that inaction might lead to more regret than action over long periods of time, see id. at
270; or that immediate "hot regret" and long-term "wistful regret" are two different phenomena.
See Daniel Kahneman, Varieties of Counterfactual Thinking, in WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN, supra
note 100, at 375, 391. In any case, research focusing on more compartmentalized types of
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A related explanation of the preference for inaction over action
is that individuals often perceive greater personal control over ac-
tions. Researchers in social psychology have also identified controlla-
bility of an element as an important determinant of mutability.12 0
That is, an individual is more likely to mentally alter an element of an
event to produce a counterfactual alternative when that element is
within his control21 For example, one group of experimenters pro-
vided subjects with a scenario describing several occurrences that
delayed the protagonist's drive home.122  When asked to revise the
scenario to get the protagonist home more quickly, subjects tended to
change elements within the protagonist's control (such as stopping for
beer) rather than those beyond his control (such as waiting for sheep
to cross the road) m  It is intuitive that controllability is probably an
important driver of the feeling of regret.'2 The thought that some-
thing bad happened when something good could have happened in-
stead is likely to be more distressing when the actor also thinks he
could have done something to avoid the negative outcome125 Actions,
therefore, tend to be more mutable than failures to act both because
they are contrary to the norm and because they tend to be perceived
as within greater control of individual actors. 26
decisions, in which the consequences of choices will become relatively clear, at least after the
fact-that is, problems more analogous to those presented to the subjects in contract negotiation
experiments-has consistently found that action leads to greater ex post regret than inaction.
120. Cf. Itamar Simonson, The Influence of Anticipating Regret and Responsibility on
Purchase Decisions, 19 J. CONSUMER RES. 105, 105 (1992) (noting that regret can result both
from comparing an outcome with alternatives "and from the feeling of responsibility or self-
blame for the disappointing outcome").
121. See Roese & Olson, supra note 105, at 31-32; see also Miller & Taylor, supra note 100,
at 322 ("[Regret] will arise whenever the individual can easily imagine himself or herself having
acted differently."). Miller and Taylor emphasize the counterintuitive finding that regret does
not require that the decision leading to the negative outcome have been objectively bad or
illogical. Compare id. at 322, with Robert Sugden, Regret Recrimination and Rationality, 19
THEORY AND DECISION 77, 89 (1985) (postulating that a rejected alternative can lead to regret if
"the individual could sensibly blame himself" for having rejected it).
122. See Vittorio Girotto et al., Event Controllability in Counterfactual Thinking, 78 ACTA
PSYCHOLOGICA 111 (1991).
123. See id. at 126-27.
124. Cf. Roese & Olson, supra note 105, at 38 ('The realization that an aversive incident
might have been avoided can heighten distress.").
125. See Ritov & Baron, supra note 102, at 275 (noting that subjects who said they would
not vaccinate their child when the risk of death from the vaccination was positive, but less than
the risk of death from disease in the absence of vaccination, explained their positions in terms of
the heightened personal responsibility they would feel if they acted and their child died than if
they failed to act and their child died).
126. See Gilovich et al., supra note 93, at 182-83 (noting that inaction is more often the




To better understand these concepts, consider the following
hypothetical: Mr. Jones is driving home from work when his car is
struck by another driver.2 7 Assume that Mr. Jones left work at his
standard time of departure but took the scenic route (which he usu-
ally did not take) in order to enjoy the nice weather. Norm theory
would lead'to the prediction that in constructing counterfactual alter-
natives in response to the experienced event, Mr. Jones would be
likely to imagine ways that he could have avoided the accident. It
would also lead to the prediction that Mr. Jones would be more likely
to mentally construct a counterfactual in which he drove home along
his usual route than one in which he left the office earlier (or later).
The accident could have been avoided, of course, had Mr. Jones
altered his route or his time of departure. But the route is likely to
seem more mutable-that is, alternatives to the route are more
mentally available-than the time of departure, because the route
taken was unusual and within Mr. Jones's control, while the
departure time was usual.
That the relative availability of counterfactual alternatives can
affect an individual's emotional responses to events is demonstrated
by the following simple experiment, performed by Kahneman and
Miller, based on facts similar to the story involving Mr. Jones.
Experimental subjects were given the following information and ques-
tion: "Mr. Adams was involved in an accident while driving home
after work on his regular route. Mr. White was involved in a similar
accident while driving on a route that he only takes when he wants a
change of scenery. Who is more upset over the accident?"128
Eighty-two percent of subjects judged that Mr. White would be
more upset, while only eighteen percent thought that Mr. Adams
would be more upset.12 9 Presumably, the reason is that Mr. White's
negative experience resulted from an action that seemed highly muta-
ble-choosing an abnormal route-while Mr. Adam's negative experi-
ence resulted from a form of inaction-taking the usual route.
Consequently, it is easier for subjects to construct a counterfactual
alternative to Mr. White's experience that is superior to the actual
experience. The ease of this comparison creates the prediction among
subjects that Mr. White will experience a more negative emotional
127. The example is a modification of an experimental scenario created by Kahneman and
Tversky. See Kahneman & Miller, supra note 95, at 143.
128. Kahneman & Miller, supra note 95, at 145.
129. See id.
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response to the event. "The availability of the counterfactual," con-
cludes Daniel Kalmeman, "controls the intensity of regret."130
If the description of human cognition provided by norm theory
is accurate, it becomes clear why subjects believed that Mr. George
(who switched his stock holdings only to find that the decision had
negative consequences) would regret his decision more than Mr. Paul
(who chose not to act, to his ultimate financial peril) would regret
his.13 It would be easier for Mr. George to imagine a counterfactual
situation in which he had made a successful investment decision than
it would be for Mr. Paul to imagine such a counterfactual situation.
Consequently, Mr. George would be more likely to view his choice as
the cause of his unfortunate result and regret making that choice,
whereas Mr. Paul is more likely to see his poor result as uncontrolla-
ble or inevitable. While Mr. Paul might feel badly about losing
money, his unhappiness is less likely to be compounded by feelings of
regret over his choice.
2. Regret vs. Rejoicing
Even if the risk of regret is greater for actions than for failures
to act, there should be no behavioral bias in favor of inaction if the
potential psychological benefits of action relative to inaction are sig-
nificant enough to compensate for the higher risk action entails.
Psychological evidence suggests, however, that anticipation of regret
over actions that yield disappointing results is usually stronger than
the anticipation of rejoicing over actions that yield desirable results. 132
For example, Landman found that experimental subjects believed
that a student who changed classes and received a high grade would
feel more elated than a student who did not change classes and re-
ceived a high grade.13 3 But this effect was much weaker than subjects'
judgments that a student who changed classes and received a low
grade would feel more regret than a student who did not change
classes and received the same low grade."'
That anticipated regret is likely to be stronger than antici-
pated rejoicing is consistent with the well-established theory of "loss
130. Kalmeman, supra note 119, at 389.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
132. See generally Landman, supra note 90, at 527-28.
133. See idi at 529-30.
134. See id. at 530.
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aversion."1 5 Loss aversion theory posits that the utility consequences
to individuals of suffering a "loss" from a reference point will be
greater than an equivalent "gain" from the same reference point. 136 If
losses loom larger than gains, it follows logically that anticipated
regret would loom larger than anticipated rejoicing. The primacy of
regret over rejoicing is also consistent with the predictions of norm
theory. Desirable events are likely to be more mentally available
than undesirable events. A consequence of this is that an individual
experiencing an undesirable event will likely have an easier time
constructing a positive counterfactual alternative (and thus generat-
ing feelings of regret) than an individual experiencing a desirable
event will have constructing a negative counterfactual alternative
(and thus generating feelings of rejoicing.)
s7
Finally, the primacy of regret over rejoicing is consistent with
a large body of interdisciplinary research demonstrating that negative
events generally evoke stronger responses than positive ones.
138
Humans, like other animals, experience greater physiological changes
in the wake of negative events than positive events. 3 9 Negative
events tend to have a larger effect on mood and tend to dominate
conscious thought relative to positive events, and negative emotions
are experienced more intensely than are positive ones. 40
3. Explaining the Contract Negotiation Experiments
Norm theory and the differential amount of regret that poten-
tially can be experienced from action and inaction can serve as the
basis for an explanation of the preference for inertia observed in the
contract negotiation experiments. Subjects in conditions 1 and 3 of
135. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kabneman, Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A
Reference Dependent Model, 106 Q.J. EcON. 1039 (1991) [hereinafter Tversky & Kaheman,
Loss Aversion]. "Loss aversion" is one aspect of Tversky and Kahneman's prospect theory of
choice under uncertainty. For the initial presentation of prospect theory, see Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263
(1979) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Prospect Therory].
136. See, e.g., Tversky and Kahneman, Loss Aversion, supra note 135, at 1041-45
(reviewing empirical evidence that supports the theoretical prediction).
137. See Landman, supra note 90, at 533.
138. For a survey of this disparate literature, see Shelley E. Taylor, Asymmetrical Effects of
Positive and Negative Events: The Mobilization-Minimization Hypothesis, 110 PSYCHoL. BULL.
67 (1991). Taylor states, "[i]n summary, then, negative events appear to mobilize physiological,
affective, cognitive, and certain types of social resources to a greater degree than do positive or
neutral events. In this sense, there appears to be an asymmetry in the impact of negative
events." Id. at 72.
139. See id. at 68 (surveying the literature).
140. See id. at 69 (surveying the literature).
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the Consequential Damages scenario had to determine how much
money they would demand before they would agree to place a full
liability term in NextDay's contract with Gifts, Inc. The actuarially
expected cost of such a term (relative to a limited liability term) was
approximately $5. But if agreeing to the full liability term (action)
carried with it a risk of greater future regret than did not agreeing to
the term (inaction), subjects would be expected to demand a premium
above the term's $5 expected cost before agreeing to add the term.
Conversely, subjects in conditions 2 and 4 had to determine how much
they would be willing to pay to convince Gifts, Inc. to actively add a
limited liability term to the contract. For these subjects, the expected
actuarial benefit of a limited liability term (relative to a full liability
term) was approximately $5. But if (1) adding the limited liability
term (action) could lead to a greater fear of ex post regret than pass-
ing up the opportunity to add the limited liability term (inaction), and
(2) the possibility of ex post regret were not compensated for by the
possibility of ex post rejoicing, then subjects would be expected to offer
something less than full actuarial value in order to offset the in-
creased risk of ex post regret. The results were, of course, consistent
with this explanation: subjects in conditions 1 and 3 demanded
considerably more than $5 to act, while condition 2 and 4 subjects
offered less than $5 for action.'4'
Thus, the preference for inertia in contract negotiation can be
plausibly explained by a desire to minimize the risk of ex post regret
if a decision turns out to be suboptimal in hindsight. This explanation
assumes that the subject negotiators did not attempt to maximize the
expected profits of their client, but traded off profit potential against
the negative utility consequences of potential ex post regret. Subjects'
desire to minimize the fear of regret is not infinite, of course; subjects
are willing to accept the risk of more ex post regret for a price. 42 But
the key to this explanation of the bias in favor of inaction is that sub-
jects do demand a premium to take on the added risk of ex post regret
that action implies. 43
141. See supra Table 1.B.
142. See generally Bell, supra note 85, at 963 ("[M]inimizing... regret is not the sole crite-
rion for decision; rather, the disadvantages of regret are traded off against the value of assets
received."); Larrick, supra note 84, at 444 ("On the one hand, people want to choose the option
that maximizes their outcomes (in terms of the value of the outcome); on the other hand, they
want to avoid making poor decisions that may engender feelings of failure or disappointment.").
143. If the regret avoidance hypothesis is correct, we might expect to observe an even more
profound bias in favor of inaction in the real world than we can measure in the laboratory. In
the laboratory setting, the experimental subjects do not actually see the results of their
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B. The Uncertainty Predicate to the Regret Avoidance Account
The regret avoidance theory of inertia in contract negotiation
provides an explanation for why negotiators might not arrive at the
same distribution of contract rights regardless of how the alternatives
are presented. The explanation remains plausible even when rational
choice explanations are not; i.e., even when network or learning bene-
fits do not provide parties with an incentive to use the most common
terms, and even when the presentation of alternatives does not affect
the relative transaction costs of adopting alternative terms. At its
root is the prediction that individuals will mentally assess the results
of opportunities actively taken differently than they assess the results
of opportunities not taken.
The theory, though, can only potentially describe negotiating
behavior under conditions of uncertainty: that is, when parties can-
not be sure at the time they are bargaining over contract terms which
of the alternative terms will be most beneficial in the future.'" If
parties can be certain of both the value of what they are giving up or
foregoing in negotiations and the value of what they receive in return,
then there would be no reason to fear future regret over the choice. In
such a situation, the regret avoidance theory would lead to the predic-
tion that there would be no inertia effect in contract negotiations;
parties should bargain to identical contract terms regardless of which
terms will govern in the case of inaction, at least in the absence of
transaction costs, asymmetric information, or learning/network
benefits to following others. Put another way, in unusual situations
in which the choice of contract terms entails no risk, the Coase
Theorem should hold true.
Two varieties of uncertainty, both fueled by regret avoidance
behavior, can conceivably lead to inertia in negotiation. The first
variety, which can be called "outcome uncertainty," exists when
future, unpredictable events will determine the value of a proposed
change from the status quo. The second variety, which can be called
"preference uncertainty," exists when the negotiator's preference for a
change from the status quo can change in the future.145 A party
considering whether to spend $10 on a coin flip in which "heads" will
decisions, as they would in real life, which could make them less susceptible to fear of future
regret than they otherwise would be.
144. The two articles that originally introduced the concept of regret theory to the econom-
ics literature state in their titles that the theory applies to decision making under conditions of
uncertainty. See Bell, supra note 85; Loomes & Sugden, supra note 87.
145. Cf. George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, 3 J. ECON. PERSP.,
Fall 1989, at 181.
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return $20 and "tails" will return $0 faces outcome uncertainty
because the unknown result of a future coin ffip will determine the
value of what he has purchased. But that party does not face
preference uncertainty because the payoffs associated with the action
(taking the gamble) and inaction (keeping the $10) are
commensurable: if the coin comes up heads, he is certain to prefer the
$20 payoff to his original $10 entitlement; if the coin comes up tails,
he is certain to prefer the original entitlement to his $0 payoff. In
contrast, a party who considers buying a mug for $5 faces no outcome
uncertainty because the payoffs associated with action and inaction
are certain. He does, however, face preference uncertainty. At the
time the purchase decision is made he may believe he prefers the mug
to $5, or vice versa, but his opinion on this matter might be different
the following week or month.
When either variety of uncertainty exists, regret avoidance
theory leads to the predictions that negotiators will be biased in favor
of inaction. All other things equal, the bias is likely to be stronger
when both forms of uncertainty exist, although it is not clear whether
the strength of the bias will be additive. When neither type of uncer-
tainty exists, however, the regret avoidance theory leads to the pre-
diction that there should be no bias in favor of inertia.
A recent set of experimental results supports this prediction.
Maya Bar-Hillel and Efrat Neter provided a group of subjects with a
lottery ticket, and then offered to trade the subjects a different lottery
ticket for the same lottery plus a small amount of cash for their origi-
nal tickets. 46 More than half of the subjects refused to trade, perhaps
because they anticipated feeling regret if they took action and the
original ticket subsequently won the lottery. 47 When the experiment-
ers endowed their subjects with a pen, however, and then offered to
trade them an identical pen plus a small amount of cash for the origi-
nal pen, more than 90% agreed to trade. 48
The direction of the results is consistent with the regret avoid-
ance theory. Subjects endowed with lottery tickets faced outcome
uncertainty when presented the opportunity to trade. Subjects en-
dowed with pens faced neither outcome uncertainty nor preference
uncertainty. Because they were asked to trade one pen for an identi-
cal pen plus cash, there was no possibility that they would later regret
146. See Maya Bar-Hillel & Efrat Neter, Why Are People Reluctant to Exchange Lottery
Tickets?, 70 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 17-20 (1996).
147. See id.
148. See id. at 23.
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accepting the offer because it yielded an undesirable result.
Consequently, there was no possibility that counterfactual thinking
could lead to ex post regret.
C. Testing the Uncertainty Predicate of Regret Theory
The regret avoidance theory can be similarly tested in the
contract negotiation context by asking experimental subjects to value
contract terms where there is no outcome or preference uncertainty
associated with actively agreeing to a particular contract term. The
theory predicts that in such a situation there should be no observable
preference for inaction. The following manipulation of the
Impossibility Excuse scenario eliminates the outcome uncertainty
present in the original manipulations'49 of the scenario in an effort to
test this prediction. The results provide support-although they are
not dispositive-for the regret avoidance explanation of the power of
inertia in contract negotiations.
Subjects assigned to condition 7 of the Impossibility Excuse
scenario, like those assigned to condition 1, were told that the legal
default provides an excuse for a common carrier's failure to meet its
delivery obligations when an unexpected contingency arises that
makes delivery either impossible or commercially impracticable. Also
like condition 1 subjects, they were asked how much money NextDay
should demand before agreeing to add a term to the contract that
would negate the impossibility excuse. But whereas condition 1 sub-
jects were asked to place a value on a risky choice-i.e., it was unclear
how much an "excuse" term might increase NextDay's liability under
the contract for delivery failures-condition 7 subjects were told that
the financial consequences to NextDay of adding such a term to the
contract were certain: NextDay, these subjects were told, carries
liability insurance that pays all claims for delivery failures. 150 The
consequence of NextDay agreeing to a contract with Gifts, Inc. under
which no impossibility excuse existed would be a $75,000 increase to
NextDay's annual liability insurance premium. 151 Thus, although
accepting a contract term that would negate the impossibility excuse
would increase NextDay's business risk, that risk could-and
would-be ceded to a third party for a fixed price. The insurance
149. The initial experiments create a condition of outcome uncertainty, but, because the
action and inaction alternatives all lead to outcomes measured in dollars (which are commensu-
rable), they do not create a condition of preference uncertainty.
150. See infra Appendix B7.
151. See infra Appendix B7.
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contrivance established that NextDay would face no outcome
uncertainty by agreeing to a full liability term.
Condition 8 subjects, like condition 2 subjects, learned that the
legal default rule provided for no impossibility excuse. Also like
condition 2 subjects, the condition 8 subjects were asked how much
NextDay should be willing to pay Gifts, Inc. to convince Gifts, Inc. to
agree to add a term to the contract that would provide for such an
excuse. Unlike condition 2 subjects though, condition 8 subjects (like
condition 7 subjects) learned that there was a certain benefit associ-
ated with the addition of such a term: NextDay's liability insurance
carrier would reduce its annual premium by $75,000 to compensate
for NextDay's reduced business risk.152 Again, the presence of insur-
ance eliminates the outcome uncertainty present in the initial
Impossibility Excuse scenario manipulations.
If the regret theory of inertia in contract negotiations is cor-
rect, the addition of the third party insurance carrier that accepted for
a fixed price all the risk associated with the presence or absence of an
impossibility excuse term should have eliminated the inertia observed
in the three prior manipulations of the Impossibility Excuse scenario.
That is, the large, statistically significant difference between the
responses of condition 1 and 2 subjects, condition 3 and 4 subjects,
and condition 5 and 6 subjects, should evaporate. Condition 7 and 8
subjects should provide approximately identical responses to each
other. The results support this prediction. Condition 7 subjects
(N=29) provided a mean response of $39,000, while condition 8 sub-
jects (N=28) provided a mean response of $69,000. This difference
appears to suggest that subjects suddenly exchanged their preference
for inaction for a preference for action, but the responses of condition
7 and 8 subjects were actually not statistically significant. Moreover,
the gap between the responses of condition 7 and 8 subjects is
significantly different than the gap between condition 1 and 2,
condition 3 and 4, and condition 5 and 6 subjects. 153 In other words,
removing outcome uncertainty from the Impossibility Excuse scenario
neutralized subjects' preferences for inaction, just as the regret
avoidance hypothesis would predict.
152. See infra Appendix B8.
153. p < .01.
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Table 2.D. Impossibility Excuse Results
Condition N Default Rule Mean Valuation
1 22 Excuse $188,000
2 25 No Excuse $ 56,000
3 23 Excuse $139,000
(previously no excuse)
4 24 No Excuse $ 31,000
(previously excuse)
5 18 Excuse $ 63,000
(industry norm: no excuse)
6 18 No Excuse $ 20,000
(industry norm: excuse)
7 29 Excuse $ 39,000
(switching cost = $75K)
8 28 No Excuse $ 69,000
(switching cost = $75K)
The results of this manipulation suggest that the regret avoid-
ance hypothesis may provide a robust motivational theory to explain
inertia in contract negotiations. It should be strongly emphasized,
however, that such a conclusion is not definitively indicated and more
work needs to be done to test this hypothesis in the contract negotia-
tion context. Although the results are consistent with the regret
avoidance hypothesis, they might be consistent with alternative hy-
potheses as well, which suggests that more subtle testing is necessary
in the future to control for other possible explanatory factors.
Additionally, in order to eliminate the uncertainty surrounding a "no
excuse" term that existed in the initial Impossibility Excuse ma-
nipulation, the $75,000 marginal cost of insurance was introduced
into the final two manipulations of the scenarios. In addition to
eliminating uncertainty (as was desired), this contrivance also added
a focal point (the $75,000 figure) into a scenario that previously had
no focal points around which subjects' responses could coalesce. It is
possible that the introduction of a focal point, rather than the elimi-
nation of uncertainty, caused the average responses of condition 7 and
8 subjects to converge.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to expand on previous experimental
work that suggested contracting parties prefer default terms over
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alternative terms, all else equal, even when doing so appears to vio-
late the Coase Theorem. Here, evidence was presented that suggests
individuals negotiating contracts will prefer terms that will govern if
they fail to take affirmative steps to supply a contract term. The
preference for inaction is not limited to situations in which legal
defaults will govern absent action, but also exists when standard form
contracts will govern absent action. This violation of the Coase Theo-
rem can be called the "inertia theory" of contract negotiation. The
experimental evidence presented strongly suggests that observed
inertia in actual contract negotiations cannot be explained by the
learning and/or network benefits that firms can take advantage of by
using the most common standard terms.
The experimental evidence also tends to support (with qualifi-
cations) the hypothesis that the inertia theory can be best explained
by regret theory, an application of the observation that individuals do
not always treat opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs equiva-
lently. Inaction is less likely than action to lead to ex post regret
when bargaining decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty.
Consequently, negotiators do not choose between possible contract
terms solely on the basis of the inherent expected utility of each term.
Rather, inaction is weighed as a positive factor in the negotiator's
cost-benefit analysis. Before a negotiator will prefer action over inac-
tion in the selection of contract terms, the inherent expected utility of
the term that requires action must exceed the inherent expected
utility of the term associated with inaction by the amount that inac-
tion is preferred to action generally. The theory predicts that inaction
will not be preferred to action when decision choices entail no uncer-
tainty, and the experimental evidence is consistent with this predic-
tion.
The inertia theory of contract negotiations perhaps has appli-
cations that go far beyond those described in this Article, and further
study is indicated. One potentially important hypothesis for future
testing that can be derived from the experiments presented in this
Article is that contracting parties can gain a powerful advantage in
negotiations by providing a set of draft terms as the basis for detailed
negotiations with their contracting partners. The inertia theory sug-
gests that, in this way, it might be possible for a party to convince an
opposing negotiator that her uniquely preferred set of contract terms
will be enacted through "inaction" rather than action, even if those






The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship
between the parties, follows the traditional legal rule that delivery companies
like NextDay that negligently lose a package or fail to deliver it on
time-which happens occasionally-are generally liable only for damages
that were "reasonably foreseeable" at the time the delivery company takes
possession of the package from the shipper.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed that you contract around this rule by adding
a term to your contract with them that states:
WextDay will be liable for all damages proximately caused by NextDay's
negligent failure to deliver Gifts, Inc.'s merchandise on time, whether or not
such damages were reasonably foreseeable when NextDay accepted
merchandise from Gifts, Inc."
Such a term in the contract would be fully enforceable in court.
Gifts, Inc. has explained that it will be sending many packages with
NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its corporate
clients and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure to make delivery
could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious from looking at the
package itself. It would like to be protected fully from this risk. Of course,
Gifts, Inc. understands that it will have to pay a higher per-package fee to
NextDay-over and above what the contract rate would otherwise be--for
NextDay to agree to add the proposed term increasing its liability.
You must now recommend to NextDay's management the minimum
amount per package that you believe NextDay should demand if it is to
include Gifts, Inc.'s proposed term in the contract-you will, of course,
attempt to negotiate for more than that minimum demand, but you need to
establish a "bottom line" before you begin to negotiate.
You do not have a precise way to predict how much extra liability the
proposed term would create above the liability that would exist under the
usual "reasonably foreseeable" damages rule. Based on the value of Gifts,
Inc.'s shipments with other companies over the last several years and
NextDay's history of occasionally failing to make deliveries on time,
NextDay's accountants have estimated for you that, statistically, the chances
are better than 95% that an enhanced liability provision will end up costing
NextDay between $0 and $10 per package, on average (this takes into
account that few packages will be mishandled but those that are could subject
NextDay to substantial liability)-within this range the accountants cannot
predict the exact cost the provision would have. The accountants believe it is
very unlikely that such a provision would either (a) not increase NextDay's
costs at all, or (b) increase them more than $10 per package, on average.
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Questions:
What is the minimum additional charge per package, over and above
what the per-package rate would otherwise be, that you will recommend that
NextDay insist upon in return for agreeing to Gifts, Inc.'s proposed expansion
of liability (i.e., if Gifts, Inc. refuses to pay at least this much, you would
recommend that NextDay refuse to include the proposed enhanced liability
provision in the contract)? Choose one of the following choices:
_ I would recommend a minimum of $1 additional per package
_ I would recommend a minimum of $2 additional per package
__I would recommend a minimum of $3 additional per package
_ I would recommend a minimum of $4 additional per package
_ I would recommend a minimum of $5 additional per package
__I would recommend a minimum of $6 additional per package
_ I would recommend a minimum of $7 additional per package
_ I would recommend a minimum of $8 additional per package
__I would recommend a minimum of $9 additional per package
_ I would recommend a minimum of $10 additional per package
_ I would recommend that NextDay refuse to include the proposed term at
any price.
Is the law concerning contract damages described in this problem
consistent with your prior understanding of the law?






The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship
between the parties, specifies that delivery companies like NextDay are liable
for "all damages proximately caused by the delivery company's negligent
failure to deliver a shipper's merchandise on time."
NextDay would like to add a term to its contract with Gifts Inc. that
would limit its liability for negligently failing to deliver on time-which
happens occasionally-by stating that:
"In the event that NextDay fails to deliver Gifts, Inc.'s merchandise on time, its
liability will be limited to damages that were reasonably foreseeable when
NextDay accepted merchandise from Gifts, Inc."
Such a term in the contract would be fully enforceable in court.
Gifts, Inc. has explained that it will be sending many packages with
NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its corporate
clients, and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure to make delivery
could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious from the package itself. It
likes that the law fully protects it from this risk (by making NextDay liable
for all damages). NextDay understands that it will have to pay Gifts, Inc.-in
the form of giving Gifts, Inc. a discount on what it would otherwise charge
per package for overnight delivery-if it is to induce Gifts, Inc. to accept
NextDay's proposed liability limitation provision.
You must now recommend to NextDay's management the maximum
per-package discount that you believe NextDay should offer Gifts, Inc. in
exchange for Gifts, Inc. including the proposed term in the contract-you will,
of course, attempt to negotiate for less than the maximum discount, but you
need to establish an "upper limit" before you begin to negotiate.
You do not have a precise way to predict how much NextDay would
save by convincing Gifts, Inc. to include the liability limitation clause in the
contract. Based on the value of Gifts, Inc.'s shipments with other companies
over the last several years (which they have documented for you) and
NextDay's history of occasionally failing to make deliveries on time,
NextDay's accountants have estimated for you that statistically there is a
better than 95% likelihood that the limitation provision will save NextDay
between $0 and $10 per package, on average (this takes into account that few
packages will be mishandled but those that are could subject NextDay to
substantial liability under the usual liability rule)-within this range the
accountants cannot predict precisely how much savings such a provision
would create. The accountants believe it is very unlikely that such a
provision would either (a) not increase NextDay's costs at all, or (b) increase
them more than $10 per package, on average.
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Questions:
What is the maximum discount per package, below what the per-
package rate would otherwise be, that you will recommend that NextDay
offer Gifts, Inc. in return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include the liability
limitation provision in the contract (i.e. if Gifts, Inc. refuses to agree to the
provisions for that amount or less, you would recommend that NextDay
accept the usual liability prescribed by law)? Choose one of the following
choices:
I would recommend a maximum discount of $1 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $2 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $3 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $4 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $5 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $6 per package.
- I would recommend a maximum discount of $7 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $8 per package.
- I would recommend a maximum discount of $9 per package.
- I would recommend a maximum discount of $10 per package.
- I would recommend that NextDay refuse to offer any discount for the
provision.
Is the law concerning contract damages described in this problem
consistent with your prior understanding of the law?





NextDay and Gifts, Inc. have agreed to adopt, as a starting point in
negotiations, a standard form contract prepared by attorneys for the
Overnight Delivery Trade Association ("ODTA7), to which both parties are
members. The form contract is typically used as a basis for negotiations in
this type of transaction, with contracting parties making changes to the form
provisions where necessary.
The following is one of the provisions in the form contract that is
under discussion between the parties (in your situation, NextDay would be
the "Carrier" and Gifts, Inc. would be the "Shipper"):
"In the event that Carrier fails to deliver Shipper's merchandise on time,
Carrier's liability will be limited to damages that were reasonably foreseeable
when Carrier accepted merchandise from Shipper."
The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship
between the parties, specifies that common carriers like NextDay are liable
for 'all damages proximately caused by the Carrier's negligent failure to
deliver Shipper's merchandise on time," unless the parties explicitly agree
otherwise.
Gifts, Inc. has explained that it will be sending many packages with
NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its corporate
clients, and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure to make delivery
could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious from the package itself. It
wants the provision removed from the contract between the parties (thus
making NextDay liable for "all" damages rather than just "reasonably
foreseeable" damages). NextDay would obviously prefer less liability to more
liability, and therefore would like the provision to remain in the contract.
You must now recommend to NextDay's management the minimum
amount per package that you believe NextDay should demand if it is to agree
to remove the disputed provision from the contract-you will, of course,
attempt to negotiate for more than that minimum demand, but you need to
establish a "bottom line" before you begin to negotiate.
You do not have a precise way to predict how much the extra liability
that NextDay would be subject to if the provision is removed from the
contract (effectively making NextDay liable for "all" damages rather than
"reasonably foreseeable" damages) would cost NextDay. Based on the value of
Gifts, Inc.'s shipments with other companies over the last several years and
NextDay's history of occasionally failing to make deliveries on time,
NextDay's accountants have estimated for you that, statistically, the chances
are better than 95% that removing the provision would end up increasing
NextDay's liability between $0 and $10 per package, on average (this takes
into account that few packages will be mishandled but those that are could
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subject NextDay to substantial liability)-within this range the accountants
cannot predict the exact cost the provision would have.
Questions:
What is the minimum additional charge per package, over and above
what the per-package rate would otherwise be, that you will recommend that
NextDay insist upon in return for agreeing to Gifts, Inc.'s proposed expansion
of liability (i.e., if Gifts, Inc. refuses to pay at least this much, you would
recommend that NextDay refuse to remove the limited liability provision
from the contract)? Choose one of the following choices:
I would recommend a minimum of $1 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $2 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $3 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $4 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $5 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $6 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $7 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $8 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $9 additional per package
I would recommend a minimum of $10 additional per package
I would recommend that NextDay refuse to remove the provision at any
price.
Is the law concerning contract damages described in this problem
consistent with your prior understanding of the law?






NextDay and Gifts, Inc. have agreed to adopt, as a starting point in
negotiations, a standard form contract prepared by attorneys for the
Overnight Delivery Trade Association ("ODTA"), to which both parties are
members. The form contract is typically used as a basis for negotiations in
this type of transaction, with contracting parties making changes to the form
provisions where necessary.
The following is one of the provisions in the form contract that is
under discussion between the parties (in your situation, NextDay would be
the "Carrier" and Gifts, Inc. would be the "Shipper"):
"Carrier will be liable for all damages proximately caused by Carrier's
negligent failure to deliver Shipper's merchandise on time, whether or not
such damages were reasonably foreseeable when Carrier accepted
merchandise from Shipper."
The law in your state, which will govern the contractual relationship
between the parties, follows the traditional legal rule that carriers like
NextDay that negligently lose a package or fail to deliver it on time-which
happens occasionally-are generally liable only for damages that were
"reasonably foreseeable" at the time the carrier takes possession of the
package from the shipper, unless the parties explicitly agree otherwise.
Thus, if the above provision were to be removed from the contract between
the parties, NextDay would be liable only for "reasonably foreseeable"
damages, rather than "all" damages.
Gifts, Inc. has explained that it will be sending many packages with
NextDay of various values and various levels of urgency for its corporate
clients and that, depending on the circumstances, a failure to make delivery
could be very costly to it even if this is not obvious from looking at the
package itself. Gifts, Inc. likes that the provision in the form contract fully
protects it from this risk. NextDay would obviously prefer less liability to
more liability, and therefore would like the provision removed from the final
contract.
You must now recommend to NextDay's management the maximum
per-package discount that you believe NextDay should offer Gifts, Inc. in
exchange for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to remove the provision from the final
contract between the parties-you will, of course, attempt to give Gifts, Inc.
less than the maximum discount (you might even convince Gifts, Inc. to
remove the provision without any payment), but you need to establish an
"upper limit" before you begin to negotiate.
You do not have a precise way to predict how much NextDay would
save by convincing Gifts, Inc. to remove the disputed provision from the
contract. Based on the value of Gifts, Inc.'s shipments with other companies
over the last several years (which they have documented for you) and
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NextDay's history of occasionally failing to make deliveries on time,
NextDay's accountants have estimated for you that statistically there is a
better than 95% likelihood that removing the provision would reduce
NextDay's liability between $0 and $10 per package, on average (this takes
into account that few packages will be mishandled but those that are could
subject NextDay to substantial liability under the usual liability
rule)-within this range the accountants cannot predict precisely how much
savings such a provision would create.
Questions:
What is the maximum discount per package, below what the per-
package rate would otherwise be, that you will recommend that NextDay
offer Gifts, Inc. in return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to remove the unlimited
liability provision from the form contract (i.e. if Gifts, Inc. refuses to agree to
remove the provision for that amount or less, you would believe NextDay
would be better off with the higher liability provided under the form contract
than paying Gifts, Inc. what it demands, and thus recommend that NextDay
accept that provision in the form contract)? Choose one of the following
choices:
- I would recommend a maximum discount of $1 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $2 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $3 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $4 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $5 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $6 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $7 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $8 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $9 per package.
I would recommend a maximum discount of $10 per package.
I would recommend that NextDay refuse to offer any discount for
removing the provision.
Is the law concerning contract damages described in this problem
consistent with your prior understanding of the law?





Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as
in most others, the occurrence of a contingency that is both unforeseen and
beyond the control of the delivery company that makes it physically
impossible or commercially impractical within reason for it to meet its
delivery obligation constitutes a valid excuse for non-performance of the
delivery obligation. In such a situation the delivery company must refund the
money it charged its customer for the delivery but is not responsible for any
additional damages.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed its contract with NextDay include the
following provision, which would be enforceable:
WextDay will be liable for applicable contract damages should it fail to
deliver a package on the next day, as promised under the contract, regardless
of the occurrence of any contingency, whether or not it is unforeseen or beyond
NextDay's control."
Gifts, Inc. is planning to offer NextDay a flat amount of money in
return for NextDay agreeing to include this term in the contract for next
year. NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn
revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be
profit. Agreeing to include this term in the contract would increase
NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond its control could
result in substantial liability.
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Questions:
What is the minimum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay demand from Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the lowest amount that NextDay
should be willing to accept, not the amount it should propose in initial
negotiations).
$ - (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next year's
contract).
What amount would you recommend that NextDay put forward as its
initial demand for the inclusion of the provision (as opposed to the minimum
amount it would accept)?
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?




Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as
in most others, the occurrence of such a contingency is no defense to a breach
of contract claim-that is, NextDay is still held liable for damages despite
occurrences beyond its control.
NextDay would like to propose to Gifts, Inc. that the contract between
the two include the following provision, which would be enforceable:
"If a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond NextDay's control occurs
making it physically impossible or commercially impractical within reason for
NextDay to meet its 'next day' delivery obligation, NextDay will refund the
money paid for the shipment of the package but Gifts, Inc. will not be entitled
to any additional contract damages."
NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn
revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be
profit. NextDay is considering offering Gifts, Inc. a flat amount of money in
return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include this term in their contract for next
year, thus reducing NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond
its control could result in substantial liability and reduced profits.
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Questions:
What is the maximum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e. the most that NextDay should be
willing to pay, not the amount it should propose in initial negotiations).
$ _ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next year's
contract).
What amount do you recommend NextDay put forward as its initial
offer for the inclusion of the above provision (as opposed to the maximum
amount it would be willing to pay):
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?




Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it impos-
sible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation of
providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Until last year, the law of your
state-as is true of the law of most states-provided that the occurrence of
such a contingency is no defense to a breach of contract claim-that is,
NextDay could be held liable for damages despite occurrences beyond its
control.
Under the new law, the occurrence of a contingency that is both un-
foreseen and beyond the control of the delivery company that makes it
physically impossible or commercially impractical within reason for it to meet
its delivery obligation constitutes a valid excuse for non-performance of the
delivery obligation (unless the parties have specifically agreed otherwise). In
such a situation the delivery company must refund the money it charged its
customer for the delivery but is not responsible for any additional damages.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed that its contract with NextDay include the
following provision, which would be enforceable:
WNextDay will be liable for applicable contract damages should it fail to
deliver a package on the next day, as promised under the contract, regardless
of the occurrence of any contingency, whether or not it is unforeseen or beyond
NextDay's control."
Gifts, Inc. is planning to offer NextDay a flat amount of money in
return for NextDay agreeing to include this term in the contract for next
year. NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn
revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be
profit. Agreeing to include this term in the contract would increase
NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond its control could
result in substantial liability and reduce its profits.
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Questions:
What is the minimum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay demand from Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the lowest amount that NextDay
should be willing to accept, not the amount it should propose in initial
negotiations).
$ __ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next
year's contract).
What amount would you recommend that NextDay put forward as its
initial demand for the inclusion of the provision (as opposed to the minimum
amount it would accept)?
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?




Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Until last year, the law of your
state-as the law of most other states-provided that the occurrence of a
contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond the control of the delivery
company that makes it physically impossible or commercially impractical
within reason for it to meet its delivery obligation constitutes a valid excuse
for non-performance of the delivery obligation. In such a situation the
delivery company must refund the money it charged its customer for the
delivery but is not responsible for any additional damages. Under the new
law, however, the occurrence of such a contingency is no defense to a breach
of contract claim unless the parties specifically agree otherwise-that is,
NextDay can be held liable for damages despite occurrences beyond its
control.
You are considering proposing that NextDay's contract with Gifts,
Inc. include the following provision, which would be enforceable:
"If a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond NextDay's control occurs
making it physically impossible or commercially impractical within reason for
NextDay to meet its 'next day' delivery obligation, NextDay will refund the
money paid for the shipment of the package but Gifts, Inc. will not be entitled
to any additional contract damages."
NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn
revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be
profit. NextDay is considering offering Gifts, Inc. a flat amount of money in
return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include this term in their contract for next
year, thus reducing NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond
its control could result in substantial liability and reduced profits.
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Questions:
What is the maximum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the most that NextDay should be
willing to pay, not the amount it should propose in initial negotiations)?
$ _ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next
year's contract).
What amount do you recommend NextDay put forth as its initial offer
for the inclusion of the above provision (as opposed to the maximum amount
it would be willing to pay)?
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?




Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as
in most others, the occurrence of a contingency that is both unforeseen and
beyond the control of the delivery company that makes it physically
impossible or commercially impractical within reason for it to meet its
delivery obligation constitutes a valid excuse for non-performance of the
delivery obligation. In such a situation the delivery company must refund the
money it charged its customer for the delivery but is not responsible for any
additional damages.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed its contract with NextDay include the
following provision, which would be enforceable. Provisions like this are
quite common-in fact, they are included in the vast majority of commercial
shipping contracts, including the majority of NextDay's contracts with
commercial shippers:
"NextDay will be liable for applicable contract damages should it fail to
deliver a package on the next day, as promised under the contract, regardless
of the occurrence of any contingency, whether.or not it is unforeseen or beyond
NextDay's control."
Gifts, Inc. is planning to offer NextDay a flat amount of money in
return for NextDay agreeing to include this term in the contract for next
year. NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn
revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be
profit. Agreeing to include this term in the contract would increase
NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond its control could
result in substantial liability.
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Questions:
What is the minimum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay demand from Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the lowest amount that NextDay
should be willing to accept, not the amount it should propose in initial
negotiations).
$ __ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next
year's contract).
What amount would you recommend that NextDay put forward as its
initial demand for the inclusion of the provision (as opposed to the minimum
amount it would accept)?
$ ___
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?
Y Not Sure/Don't KnowYes SNo
1 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
APPENDIX B6
Description of Situation:
Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as
in most others, the occurrence of such a contingency is no defense to a breach
of contract claim-that is, NextDay is still held liable for damages despite
occurrences beyond its control.
NextDay would like to propose to Gifts, Inc. that the contract between
the two include the following provision, which would be enforceable.
Provisions like this are quite common-in fact, they are included in the vast
majority of commercial shipping contracts, including the majority of
NextDay's contracts with commercial shippers:
"If a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond NextDay's control occurs
making it physically impossible or commercially impractical within reason for
NextDay to meet its 'next day' delivery obligation, NextDay will refund the
money paid for the shipment of the package but Gifts, Inc. will not be entitled
to any additional contract damages."
NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn
revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which about 20% will be
profit. NextDay is considering offering Gifts, Inc. a flat amount of money in
return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include this term in their contract for next
year, thus reducing NextDay's exposure to the possibility that events beyond
its control could result in substantial liability and reduced profits.
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Questions:
What is the maximum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e. the most that NextDay should be
willing to pay, not the amount it should propose in initial negotiations).
$ _ (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next
year's contract).
What amount do you recommend NextDay put forward as its initial
offer for the inclusion of the above provision (as opposed to the maximum
amount it would be willing to pay):
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?




Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as
in most others, the occurrence of a contingency that is both unforeseen and
beyond the control of the delivery company that makes it physically
impossible or commercially impractical within reason for it to meet its
delivery obligation constitutes a valid excuse for non-performance of the
delivery obligation. In such a situation the delivery company must refund the
money it charged its customer for the delivery but is not responsible for any
additional damages.
Gifts, Inc. has proposed its contract with NextDay include the
following provision, which would be enforceable.
'NextDay will be liable for applicable contract damages should it fail to
deliver a package on the next day, as promised under the contract, regardless
of the occurrence of any contingency, whether or not it is unforeseen or beyond
NextDay's control."
NextDay has insurance that would protect it against liabilities it
might incur in such circumstances-that is, it would not have to pay damages
it owes as a result of the proposed provision out of its own pockets. However,
if the provision is included in the contract, NextDay's insurance company
would increase NextDay's annual insurance premium by $75,000 to cover the
costs of assuming additional liability. (NextDay expects that, under its
contract with Gifts, Inc., it will earn revenues of approximately $2 million per
year, of which about 20% will be profit.)
Gifts, Inc. is planning to offer NextDay a flat amount of money in
return for NextDay agreeing to include this term in the contract for next
year.
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Questions:
What is the minimum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay demand from Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the lowest amount that NextDay
should be willing to accept, not the amount it should propose in initial
negotiations).
$ - (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next
year's contract).
What amount would you recommend that NextDay put forward as its
initial demand for the inclusion of the provision (as opposed to the minimum
amount it would accept)?
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?




Occasionally, an unexpected contingency arises that makes it
impossible or commercially unreasonable for NextDay to meet its obligation
of providing "next day" delivery, as promised. Under the law of your state, as
in most others, the occurrence of such a contingency is no defense to a breach
of contract claim-that is, NextDay is still held liable for damages despite
occurrences beyond its control (although it purchases insurance to cover it for
any such liability).
NextDay would like to propose to Gifts, Inc. that the contract between
the two include the following provision, which would be enforceable.
"If a contingency that is both unforeseen and beyond NextDay's control occurs
making it physically impossible or commercially impractical within reason for
NextDay to meet its 'next day' delivery obligation, NextDay will refund the
money paid for the shipment of the package but Gifts, Inc. will not be entitled
to any additional contract damages."
Although NextDay has insurance that covers it for liability arising
from its failure to deliver, it has an interest in limiting its liability.
NextDay's insurance company has agreed to reduce NextDay's annual
insurance premium by $75,000 if the above provision is included in its
contract with Gifts, Inc. (NextDay expects that, under its contract with Gifts,
Inc., it will earn revenues of approximately $2 million per year, of which
about 20% will be profit.)
NextDay is considering offering Gifts, Inc. a flat amount of money in
return for Gifts, Inc. agreeing to include this term in their contract for next
year.
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Questions:
What is the maximum amount of money that you would recommend
that NextDay offer Gifts, Inc. in return for the inclusion of the above
provision in the contract for next year (i.e., the most that NextDay should be
willing to pay, not the amount it should propose in initial negotiations).
$ - (flat amount for inclusion of the provision in next
year's contract).
What amount do you recommend NextDay put forward as its initial
offer for the inclusion of the above provision (as opposed to the maximum
amount it would be willing to pay):
Is the law described in this problem consistent with your prior under-
standing of the law?
__Yes Not Sure/Don't Know No

